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INTRODUCTION 
Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted 
governmental function, and there is no principled way of distinguishing it 
from the other public purposes the Court has recognized.1
Just like state and local governments, Indian tribes, as separate sovereign 
governments, have an obligation to improve the lives of their citizens. When such 
governmental entities engage in economic development activities to elevate the 
economic status of their constituencies, they often seek outside funding to finance 
those activities. Many tribal governments, however, are still suffering from the 
impacts of deleterious historical federal policies.2 Additionally, tribal communities 
are often burdened with extremely low socio-economic factors, including low 
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1 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2658 (2005). 
2 See Part II infra 
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educational achievement,3 high unemployment,4 high poverty,5 and low per capita 
income.6 For many tribes the only sources of capital to address these problems are 
limited to grants and other assistance from the federal government, but such funds 
are often insufficient to address the myriad responsibilities facing tribal 
governments.7
Contrary to popular belief, gaming does not provide sufficient funds to meet 
the needs of all tribal governments, as most of the more than 560 federally 
recognized Indian tribes8 do not have any form of gaming operations,9 and of those 
that do, only a small handful generate significant revenues.10 While a small number 
of tribes near major metropolitan centers have started successful gaming 
enterprises, hundreds of tribes have not entered the gaming industry, and many that 
have participated actually operate casinos located far from population centers.11 
Most reservations are characterized by extensive land bases, spread out 
communities, and homesteads mired in one long-standing poverty cycle.12 In fact, 
the need for economic development in Indian Country remains acute and impacts 
nearly every aspect of reservation life, as most Indian tribes have an economy that 
is on par with third world countries. The unemployment rate, for example, hovers 
around 50 percent for Indians who live on reservations, nearly ten times that for 
the nation as a whole, and almost one third of American Indians live in poverty.13
All too many tribal governments lack the ability to provide the basic 
infrastructure most U.S. citizens take for granted, such as passable roadways, 
affordable housing, and the plumbing, electricity, and telephone services that come 
with a modern home. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, approximately 20% of 
American Indian households on reservations lack complete plumbing facilities, 
compared to 1% of all U.S. households. About 1 in 5 American Indian reservation 
households dispose of sewage by means other than public sewer, septic tanks, or 
 
3 Raymond C. Ettcity, Report of the Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government 
Entities (ACT), p. II-7. 
4 Average unemployment on Indian reservations is 13.6% (with some reservations having 
unemployment levels above 50%). The general U.S. population has unemployment rate of 5.8%. See 
U.S. Census Bureau 2000. 
5 The average percentage of American Indians living in poverty is 25.67%, compared 12.38% 
for the general population. See U.S. Census Bureau 2000. 
6 Per capital income for American Indians is $12,893.00, compared to the overall U.S. average 
of $21,587.00. See U.S. Census 2000. 
7 Ettcity at p. II-7 
8 “Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of 
Indian Affairs,” Federal Register, November 25, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 226), p. 71193 
9 According to the National Indian Gaming Association, only 217 tribes have gaming operations 
of any kind (cite to NIGA stats).  
10 See National Gambling Impact Survey Commission Report, p. 2-10 (“The 20 largest Indian 
gambling facilities account for 50.5 percent of total revenues, with the next 85 accounting for [only] 
41.2 percent. Additionally, not all gambling facilities are successful. Some tribes operate their casinos 
at a loss and a few have even been forced to close money-losing facilities.”) 
11 See Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, December 16, 2002.  
12 “Entrepreneurial Sector is the Key to Indian Country Development,” Indian Country Today, 
September 6, 2002 at p. A2. 
13 See Tex Hall, The Native American Capital Formation and Economic Development Act of 
2003: Testimony on Senate Bill 519, 2003. 
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cesspool.14 The Navajo reservation is the same size as West Virginia, yet it only 
has 2,000 miles of paved roads while West Virginia has 18,000 miles.15 Obviously, 
roads, telephones, electricity, and the like are taken for granted by investors and 
employers even in the most distressed inner cities of the United States. Their 
absence from large portions of Indian country poses a daunting barrier to tribal 
leaders’ attempts to attract new private sector investment and jobs. 
Such realities highlight the importance of stimulating economic development 
to create economic opportunity for tribal members. Many scholars, investors, and 
tribal officials charged with developing their economies are well aware that access 
to capital for tribes and individual Indian entrepreneurs is a significant and 
pressing problem. The unanswered question is one of capital formation: How do 
tribes obtain the necessary capital to build a permanent economic base? The 
answer should be to access the capital markets in the same way that state and local 
governments do to finance their own economic development activities, but as this 
article will demonstrate, severe impediments to a level playing field continue to 
plague Indian Country. 
State and local governments obtain revenues to finance their operations 
primarily through three channels: tax revenues, borrowing, and federal grants.16 
Borrowing has increasingly become a favored method of raising revenue for state 
and local governments.17 These entities may, with some exceptions, issue so called 
“tax-exempt” bonds.18 This tax-exempt status of municipal bonds has been a part 
of the Federal Tax Code since its adoption in 1913.19 Fippinger explains that a tax-
exempt bond is “a debt security in which the interest portion of the debt service 
paid is not included in gross income.”20 The tax-exempt status of municipal debt 
allows state and local governments to issue bonds at lower interest rates, since the 
income from those bonds results in the same net level of income for taxpayers in 
higher tax brackets.  
To illustrate this phenomenon, assume that a taxpayer whose effective tax rate 
is 40 percent purchases a $1000 taxable bond from a corporation that pays interest 
of 10 percent. She will receive an annual interest payment of $100, but she must 
 
14 Statistical Brief, Housing of American Indian on Reservations - Plumbing. 1995, Bureau of 
the Census 
15 Michael J. Kurman, Indian Investment and Employment Tax Incentives, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 
578 ( 1994). 
16 M. David Gelfand, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING, §1.04, Clark Boardman 
Callaghan (2003) 
17 Such obligations fall under the heading of “municipal securities” in Section 3(a)(29) of the 
1934 Act. The applicable definition under this section for our purposes describes a municipal security 
as “direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by, a State or any 
political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of a State or any political subdivision 
thereof, an any municipal corporate instrumentality of one or more states…” Therefore, municipal 
security or municipal debt, when used in this article, can refer to a state, municipality, or an agency or 
instrumentality of either. 
18 I.R.C. §103 (1986). 
19 Eric J. Gouvin, Radical Tax Reform, Municipal Finance, and the Conservative Agenda, 56 
RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 424 (2004). 
20 Robert A. Fippinger, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE, §1:2.2, Practicing Law 
Institute (2002). 
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pay $40 of that in taxes, resulting in a net income of $60. If she were to purchase a 
$1000 tax-exempt bond from a municipality that pays 6 % in interest, she would 
still receive $60 and would be economically indifferent between the two bonds, 
assuming that all other attributes of the bonds were equivalent, such as the risk of 
default and the dates of payment. Thus, the municipality can raise the same amount 
of capital as the corporation for substantially less in interest expense. 
Unfortunately, such advantage is not universally available in Indian Country. 
While many tribal economies still resemble those of a third world country, a small 
number of tribal economies have been able to expand,21 and approximately 15% of 
the tribes22 have been able to obtain debt financing from a variety of lenders23 to 
finance economic development activities and infrastructure improvements.24 Most 
tribes, however, are still unable to access the capital markets competitively, if at 
all. A primary roadblock to capital markets is the discriminatory provisions of the 
1982 Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act (“Tribal Tax Status Act”),25 part 
of the Internal Revenue Code (“Tax Code”). While the goal of the Tribal Tax 
Status Act was to treat tribes just as states are treated in the Tax Code,26 the act 
falls far short of achieving the goal of equal treatment desired by tribes,27 and in 
fact substantially limits the ability of tribes to raise debt for economic development 
activities. Although the Tribal Tax Status Act extended “certain tax provisions to 
American Indian Tribal governments on the same basis as such provisions apply to 
States,”28 it did not recognize tribes as equivalent to states for all tax purposes, 
specifically denying them the elements of public finance that they desired most.29 
While the federal policy of exempting from federal taxation interest paid on 
state bonds issued to finance and effectuate state policy is a recognition and 
affirmation of that state’s sovereignty, a similar recognition and affirmation of 
sovereignty unfortunately does not extend to Indian tribes because tribes face two 
additional restrictions that do not apply to their state and local governmental 
counterparts. In the first instance, unlike state and local governments, Indian tribes 
 
21 See FELIX COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, 2005 ed., §21.03, hereinafter 
HANDBOOK III (Professor Clarkson was a contributing author for this most recent edition of the 
HANDBOOK, providing material on tribal finance, tribal corporations, economic development, and 
intellectual property). Two earlier editions of the Handbook are also referenced in this article. Felix 
Cohen’s original Handbook was published in 1941 (hereinafter HANDBOOK I). The Handbook was 
substantially revised and reissued in 1982 (hereinafter HANDBOOK II). 
22 IRS Research Summary, on file with the author. This research summary is the result of a joint 
research project between the author and the Tax Exempt Bonds division of the IRS. 
23 Fitch Ratings Report, “Tribal Governments in the Bond Market,” February 4, 2004, p. 1 
24 Townsend Hyatt, Perry E. Israel, Alan Benjamin, An Introduction to Indian Tribal Finance 
(published by Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP) 2004. See also HANDBOOK III, §21.03. 
25 Title II of Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2608 (1982) (codified at I.R.C. §7871) (2004) 
[hereinafter Tribal Tax Status Act]. 
26 See 127 Cong. Rec. S5666, S5667 (daily ed. June 2, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Wallop (R-
Wyo.)). 
27 See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian 
Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335 (1985); 
Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative Process, 46 ADM. L. REV.
333 (Summer 1994). 
28 Senate Report No. 97-646 (1982), section I (summary). 
29 See HANDBOOK III supra note 21, §21.03[2][c]. 
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cannot issue private activity bonds.30 Worse, however, is the Tribal Tax Status 
Act’s “additional requirement”31 that tribal tax-free bond proceeds only be used for 
“essential governmental functions,”32 a restriction not applicable to state and 
municipal bonds.33 
The damage to tribal economic prospects was compounded when the act was 
amended in 1987 to clarify that tribes can only issue tax-free bonds for projects 
“customarily”34 financed by states and local governments (e.g., schools, roads, 
government buildings, etc.).35 Thus, Indian tribes can only issue tax-exempt debt if 
“substantially all” of the borrowed proceeds “are to be used in the exercise of any 
essential governmental function.”36 In addition, section 7871(e) states that “the 
term ‘essential governmental function’ shall not include any function which is not 
customarily performed by State and local governments with general taxing 
powers” but does not provide any guidance as to when a particular activity 
becomes “customary” for a municipal government. As the tax-base of a tribe is 
usually insufficient for a tribe to issue general obligation bonds37 and since the 
revenue from a revenue bond is usually linked to the project being financed,38 this 
additional restriction to “customary” governmental activity places tribes at a 
tremendous disadvantage relative to the capital markets and is inequitable when 
compared to other forms of municipal debt. 
The narrow interpretation of this language by the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) has had a demonstrably stifling effect on tribes’ tax-free bonding 
authority.39 These restrictions on the scope of what can be financed with tax-
exempt debt in particular deny poor tribes the opportunity to address their glaring 
infrastructure and economic development needs. Tribes with substantial natural 
resources or significant gaming operations have the option of financing certain 
activities on a taxable basis even if, absent a restrictive Tax Code, they would be 
able to finance those activities on a tax-exempt basis. Poorer tribes, however, do 
not have that luxury, and upwards of $50 billion in annual capital needs go unmet 
in Indian Country,40 in part because the debt service required to finance the 
 
30 See Williams supra note 27, at 382; Aprill supra note 27 at 335; see also Hyatt, Israel, et al,
supra note 24, p. 19 (“State and local governments often issue tax-exempt private activity bonds for 
the benefit of nonprofit corporations, or to finance mortgage loans for first-time low- and moderate-
income home buyers, or to finance low- and moderate-income residential rental property. Private 
activity bonds are also issued for airports, docks, and wharves, solid waste facilities, sewage 
facilities, and certain other facilities.”). Under current law, Indian tribes are barred from issuing 
private activity bonds for anything other than a tribal manufacturing facility. 26 USC §§7871(c)(2)-
(c)(3). 
31 I.R.C. §7871(c). 
32 I.R.C. §7871(c)(1). 
33 See HANDBOOK III supra note 21, §21.03[2][c]. 
34 I.R.C. §7871(e) 
35 See H. R. No. 100-391 at 1139, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
36 26 USC §7871(c)(1). “Substantially all” is not defined in the statute but is believed to mean at 
least 95% of the proceeds. See Hyatt, Israel, et al, supra note 24, p. 18 
37 See Williams supra note 27, at 385 (“few Indian communities enjoy the thriving economic 
environment necessary to sustain a stable tax base”). 
38 See Aprill supra note 27, at 342. 
39 See HANDBOOK III supra note 7, §21.03[2][c]. 
40 See Henson, E. and J. Taylor, Native America at the New Millennium, Harvard Project on 
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projects to meet those needs is too expensive at taxable rates.41 
The deleterious impact of these discriminatory restrictions can be seen in the 
relative paucity of tribal tax-exempt financings. For the years 2002, 2003, and 
2004, state and local governments issued an average of 14,038 tax exempt bonds.42 
Over the same period, tribal governments annually issued an average of five tax-
exempt bonds.43 In dollar terms, for the years 2002-2004, state and local 
governments issued on average $363.6 billion of tax-exempt debt44 while tribal 
governments issued on average only $202 million of tax-exempt debt.45 
Given the relative numbers of municipal and tribal issuers,46 the expected 
number of tribal tax-exempt issues should be more than an order of magnitude 
higher. American Indians account for more than 1.5% of the national population, 
yet tribes issue less than one tenth of one percent of the tax-exempt bonds each 
year.47
2002 
Issues
2002 Par Amount
(US$ mil) 
2003 
Issues
2003 Par Amount
(US$ mil) 
2004 
Issues
2004 Par Amount
(US$ mil) 
State authority 1,943 125,595.7 1,978 119,013.3 1,884 102,837.4
Local authority 2,109 59,156.1 2,141 62,572.7 1,837 57,197.4
District 4,351 54,509.7 4,613 56,560.5 4,298 58,235.3
City, Town or Village 4,062 46,948.4 4,330 54,526.9 3,782 53,368.7
State 272 34,042.4 262 48,401.7 241 47,042.6
County /Parish 1,047 23,325.1 1,146 24,479.3 961 23,182.0
College or University 199 7,045.9 226 8,929.4 235 8,860.1
Direct Issuer 69 3,991.1 56 4,244.1 68 5,781.3
Co-op Utility 4 930.0 - - - -
Indian tribe 4 194.4 6 233.2 5 178.4
Total 14,056 355,544.4 14,752 378,727.9 13,306 356,504.8
American Indian Economic Development Working Paper, 2003. 
41 Testimony of Dr. Gavin Clarkson before the Senate Finance Committee, May 23, 2006. 
42 See Thomson Financial data extract on file with author. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and 
local governments issued 14,056, 14,752, and 13,306 tax-exempt short and long-term bonds 
respectively. Id.; See also BOND BUYER ONLINE ARCHIVES, ANNUAL MUNICIPAL DEBT SALES, LONG 
TERM BONDS, NUMBER OF ISSUES and ANNUAL MUNICIPAL DEBT SALES, SHORT TERM BONDS,
NUMBER OF ISSUES, available at, http://www.bondbuyer.com/msa_displayquickreport.html (last 
viewed 12/12/2005), stating that for 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and local governments issued 
12,517, 13,251, and 11,993 tax-exempt long term bonds respectively and for 2002, 2003, an 2004, 
state and local governments issued 3,435, 3,300, and 3,172 tax-exempt short term bonds respectively.  
43 See Thomson Financial data extract. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued 4, 6, 
and 5 tax-exempt short and long-term bonds respectively. Id.; See also BOND BUYER ONLINE 
ARCHIVES, LONG TERM BONDS, supra, note ; BOND BUYER ONLINE ARCHIVES, SHORT TERM BONDS,
supra, note . For the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued 6, 9, and 5 long term 
bonds respectively. For the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued 0, 0, and 1 short 
term bonds respectively. (These Bond Buyer tribal bond statistics likely include some taxable bonds 
and therefore the Thomson figures provide a more accurate picture of tribal tax-exempt debt 
issuances). 
44 Id. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and local governments issued $355.5 trillion, $378.9 
trillion, and $356.5 trillion dollars of tax-exempt debt respectively. Id. 
45 Id. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued $194.4 million, $233.3 million, and 
$178.4 million dollars of tax-exempt debt respectively. Id. 
46 There are 565 federally recognized Indian Tribes and Alaskan Native Villages that could 
potentially issue municipal debt, as compared to 3,141 counties, _____ cities, and 50 states.  If ___ 
percent of all municipal issuers issue bonds each year, then the expected number of tribal issuers is 
___, well short of the average of 5 per year. 
47 Clarkson testimony, supra note 41. 
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Although many municipal bonds fund infrastructure projects, a significant 
number fund projects related to tourism and economic development. Tourism is a 
major economic force for many municipalities and is vital to the economic 
prospects of several communities. As an example, post-Katrina New Orleans is 
almost wholly dependent on a rebound in tourism for its long-term economic 
viability. Tourism and tourism-related economic development can include hotels, 
golf resorts, convention centers, and even racetracks and casinos. In particular, the 
IRS has acknowledged that several thousand municipal golf courses have been 
financed with tax-exempt debt,48 and non-tribal governments have used billions of 
tax-exempt bonds to build hotels and convention centers.49 The IRS has even 
issued recent rulings to permit tax-exempt financing for new baseball stadiums for 
the New York Yankees and the New York Mets, citing an earlier Revenue Ruling 
which held that the promotion of tourism was an “exclusively public purpose.” 50 
Nevertheless, tourism and tourism-related economic development cannot be 
financed by tribes with tax-exempt debt. 
Repurchasing ancestral homeland is another potential use for tax-exempt 
bonds, yet statutory restrictions and the extreme interpretation by the IRS have 
resulted in some highly unfortunate outcomes. In one instance, a tribe was 
interested in repurchasing some ancestral homeland adjacent to land that it already 
owned.51 Unfortunately, the land in question was farmland with an existing crop of 
corn nearing maturity. The tribe wanted to issue tax-exempt bonds to purchase the 
land but was advised that if they harvested the corn, the tax-exempt status of their 
bonds could be jeopardized. The tribe was forced to let the corn rot in order to 
preserve the tax-exempt status of the bonds. 
In another case, a tribe had the opportunity to repurchase 23,000 acres of 
ancestral homeland for approximately $5.5 million.52 Most of the land in question 
had been over forested, but a small section containing harvestable timber remained 
that would help the tribe afford the land purchase. Again, the restrictions in the Tax 
Code meant that the tribe would not be able to harvest timber on the land, and they 
could barely afford the interest payments even at tax-exempt rates. The author, 
along with another colleague were fortunately able to develop a structure that 
allowed the tribe to afford the necessary debt service, and the tribe was able to 
purchase the land. 
The IRS’s restrictive interpretation of tribal tax-exempt bonding authority has 
also meant a substantially higher audit risk for tribal bonds, as tribal governments 
are also victims of a demonstrably disproportionate number of IRS enforcement 
actions. Less than 1% of the tax-exempt municipal offerings are audited by the IRS 
 
48 Cite to IRS FSA 
49 See Part III.C.2. infra.
50 See IRS PLR 110172-06 and 107899-06. These private letter rulings concluded that the public 
purpose requirement is satisfied in part by the promotion of tourism, citing Rev. Rul. 72-194, which 
held the promotion of tourism to be an “exclusively public purpose.” These rulings are wholly 
inconsistent with the position the IRS has been taking with respect to the operation of tribal golf 
courses and hotels, which the IRS argues are not essential governmental functions. 
51 Interview with Robert Burpo of First American Financial Advisors on March 9, 2005. 
52 See Offering Memorandum for Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, on file with the 
author. 
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each year, but direct tribal tax-exempt issuances are 30 times more likely to be 
audited within four years of issue,53 and 100% of tribal conduit issuances have 
been or are currently being challenged by the IRS.54 In all of these cases, the tribes 
financed activities that had previously been financed by state and local 
governments without any challenge from the IRS. While the National Congress of 
American Indians and the National Intertribal Tax Alliance have worked to remove 
these inequities for years,55 even the venerable Wall Street firm of Merrill Lynch is 
on record decrying the inequity of the tax treatment of tribes relative to 
municipalities.56 This high rate of tribal audits becomes even more questionable 
when one realizes that tribal tax-exempt issuances make up only 0.1% of the tax-
exempt bond market.57 
One of the more egregious examples of hostile and adverse treatment of a tribe 
is the case of the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe. The tribe was not in a position to 
compete in the gaming market, but they did have sufficient land thirty miles north 
of Las Vegas to develop a golf course. The Paiutes used proceeds from a tax-free 
bond issuance to finance construction of a public golf course with a clubhouse, a 
retail store that sells golf-related items, and a restaurant, all of which were open to 
the general public.58 The tribe had good reason to believe that construction of a 
public golf course would qualify as an essential governmental function 
“customarily performed by state and local governments,”59 given that “as of 1998 
there were 2,645 publicly owned, municipal golf courses in the United States.”60 
In August of 2002, however, the IRS advised the Las Vegas Paiutes that 
construction of a public golf course is “other than an essential governmental 
function within the meaning of § 7871(e).”61 Although the IRS acknowledged that 
“it is likely that construction and operation of golf courses are customary 
governmental functions,” it nonetheless decided to deny the tax-exemption based 
on its reading of the customary use definition provided by the 1987 amendment. 
The argument set forth by the IRS was that the golf course was not “intended 
to meet the recreational needs of [the] Tribe.”62 Although other public golf courses 
can be considered essential governmental functions, the IRS took the position that 
Indian tribes cannot utilize tax-free debt to construct golf courses and 
accompanying club houses because, in its opinion, the course was not of the type 
that would be used by tribal golfers. The Field Service Advice Memorandum 
(“FSA”) admits that all publicly built and operated golf courses “are developed to 
enhance the lifestyle of both golfing and non-golfing citizens of the community 
 
53 IRS Research Summary 
54 See Alison L. McConnell, IRS' Anderson Says Attorneys At Fault for Tribal Bond Confusion, 
BOND BUYER, September 22, 2005; see discussion of IRS enforcement at Part IV.E infra.
55 NCAI and NITA citations 
56 See e.g. Merrill Lynch Municipal Credit Research, “Indian Gaming Bond Pricing Update,” 
May 24, 2004 (tribes are forced to contend with “inequities in the Tax Code”) 
57 See discussion of IRS enforcement at Part IV.E infra.
58 IRS Field Service Advice Memorandum No: 20024712 (date of release Nov. 22, 2002) 
[hereinafter FSA]. 
59 I.R.C. § 7871(e) 
60 FSA at 2. 
61 FSA at 1.  
62 FSA at 5. 
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and perhaps to create jobs,”63 and in-house counsel recommended not litigating the 
bond exemption because it would “be difficult to argue that Golf Course is so 
commercial in nature that state and local governments would not own and operate 
similar enterprises.”64 Additionally, the FSA acknowledged that “some courts, 
including the Tenth Circuit, have adopted the principle that federal statutes are to 
be construed liberally in favor of Native Americans, with ambiguous provisions 
interpreted to their benefit.”65 In short, the IRS’ position was untenable based on 
existing public practices and judicial rulings, but it denied the tax-exemption 
anyway. 
In a sharp contrast to its approach in the 2002 FSA to defining an essential 
governmental function as excluding any commercial activity, the IRS has reasoned 
that a state investment fund for cash balances constituted an essential 
governmental function because “it may be assumed that Congress did not desire in 
any way to restrict a state’s participation in enterprises that might be useful in 
carrying out those projects desirable from the standpoint of the state government 
which, on a broad consideration of the question, may be the function of the 
sovereign to conduct.”66 Thus, for purposes of section 115, the IRS has, without 
intervention by Congress, defined as an essential governmental function any 
activity that makes or saves the government money. This definition encompasses 
the very purpose of the Las Vegas Paiute Golf Course which the IRS has reasoned 
does not qualify as an essential governmental function.67 
The Las Vegas Paiute case is merely one example of the overt hostility 
towards tribal governments from both the Tax Code and the IRS enforcement 
regime. This article argues that, when compared to the treatment of other 
governmental entities, such differential treatment can appropriately be 
characterized as Tax Code Racism. 
Of course, referring to a practice of adverse and differential treatment as 
racism is not a charge to be levied lightly because an accusation of racism is one of 
the most incendiary charges that can be leveled in our society. To do so armed with 
empirical evidence, however, falls directly in line with Professor Robert Williams’ 
strategy of “direct confrontation that challenges the continuing use of racial 
stereotypes [and imagery] in thinking and talking about Indian rights by the Court 
[and] the U.S. Congress.”68 As Williams notes, the use of such empirical evidence 
was also a strong component of the successful strategy employed in Brown v. 
Board of Education.69 One challenge in discussing racism, however, is that the 
precise meaning of “racism” is often not agreed upon.70 In order to clarify the 
 
63 Id.
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 See John F. Theberge and Diana A. Imholtz, Tax-Exempt Financings Involving Indian Tribal 
Governments, The Tax Exempt Organization Tax Review 182, August 2003 (quoting Rev. Rul. 77-
261).  
67 FSA at 5. 
68 Robert A. Williams, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND 
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005) (herinafter LOADED WEAPON), p. xxviii. 
69 Id at xxxii, n58. 
70 See K. Anthony Appiah, forward to Albert Memmi RACISM (2000), p. ix (“careful attempts at 
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charge, this article will use an objective definition of racism based on the writings 
of Albert Memmi.71 Various scholars have attempted to define racism, but many of 
these attempts have been cast in terms of black-white interactions.72 When dealing 
with issues involving Indian tribes, entities with both racially and politically 
defining characteristics, Memmi’s typology of racism provides a framework for 
defining racism that has significant utility in examining the actions and perceptions 
of dominant society relative to Indian tribes.73 
Memmi was a Tunisian Jew whose perception of racism was heavily 
influenced both by his membership in a group that had a long history of being 
subjected to European racism and imperialism as well as his experience of being a 
Jew in a predominantly Arab country. Memmi also personally suffered under the 
power of European colonialism and racism, particularly when he was imprisoned 
in a Nazi work camp during World War II. Based on these and other experiences, 
Memmi proposed the following definition of racism: 
the generalizing definition and valuation of differences, whether real or 
imaginary, to the advantage of the one defining and deploying them [accuser], 
and to the detriment of the one subjected to the act of definition [victim], 
whose purpose is to justify (social or physical) hostility and assault 
[aggression].74 
His analysis also discusses four essential “moments” of racism: 
1. An insistence on difference, whether real or imaginary. The perceived 
difference can be somatic, cultural, religious, etc.; the emphasis is on the 
discernment of its existence, rather than its nature or content.  
2. The imposition of a negative valuation upon those seen as differing, implying 
(by the act of imposition) a positive valuation for those imposing it. 
3. This differential valuation rendering the difference unignorable is made 
absolute by generalizing to an entire group that is then deprecated in turn.  
4. The negative valuation imposed upon that group becomes the legitimization 
and justification for present or possible hostility, aggression, or privilege.75 
The power of Memmi’s typology of racism lies in the fact that his definition 
does not require that the perceived differences be only biological in nature, as (real 
or imaginary) cultural differences could just as easily be used to justify aggression 
or privilege as could biological differences. Such has been the case with Indian 
tribes, as many of the policies directed towards them were based on a hostile 
 
a definition [of racism] are surprisingly rare”).  
71 See e.g. Albert Memmi RACISM (2000). 
72 See e.g. Jody David Armour, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COST OF 
BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997); Joel Kovel, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY, __ (1970). 
73 See generally Williams, LOADED WEAPON, supra note 68; Robert A. Williams, Documents of 
Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in The Narrative 
Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1989) 
74 Memmi, RACISM, supra note ___ at 100. Memmi’s original definition, presented in Memmi, 
Attempt at a Definition, in DOMINATED MAN: NOTES TOWARD A PORTRAIT (1968) at 185, was quite 
similar: “the generalized and final assigning of values to real or imaginary differences, to the 
accuser’s benefit and at his victim’s expense, in order to justify the former’s own privileges or 
aggression.” 
75 Memmi, RACISM, supra note ___ at xvii-xviii. 
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perception of tribalism76 while others were based on negative perceptions of 
biological differences.77
Noted postcolonial theorist Homi Bhaba posits a similar notion of “colonial 
discourse,” suggesting that its use “as an apparatus of power, at a minimum, turns 
on the recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences”78 and that 
the “objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of 
degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to 
establish systems of administration and instruction.”79 
Given the broad authority that the federal government has in managing Indian 
affairs, laws and policies based on racist notions are particularly deleterious when 
considering that dominant society’s perception of Indian tribes has often been 
racist in nature. Part I of this article discusses the nature of Indian tribes and their 
relationship to the federal government and makes the argument that while the 
United States is usually forced to deal with tribes on a government-to-government 
basis, racist attitudes fundamentally shape the nature of those interactions despite 
the inherent recognition of tribal sovereignty. While the charge of racism is levied 
against the Tax Code and its concomitant regulations, the tribes feel the impact of 
the alleged racism when they approach capital markets in competition with other 
governmental entities.  
For those readers unfamiliar with public finance, Part II of this article 
introduces governmental access to the capital markets, including a discussion of 
the policy justifications for tax-free treatment of municipal debt. This section also 
identifies those elements of the public finance market that are either unavailable to 
tribes or are only available under restrictive conditions that apply to tribes but do 
not restrict other governmental entities. Although the last quarter century has seen 
many racist policies and laws replaced by a formal federal policy of tribal self-
determination, the specter of racism still lurks in the shadows, occasionally rearing 
its ugly head. As mentioned earlier, one such instance that provides the basis for 
this article’s charge of Tax Code racism is the political and regulatory 
maneuvering during and after the passage of the Tribal Tax Status Act. Part III 
examines the legislative and regulatory history of this Act and its subsequent 
enforcement, providing detailed empirical evidence of demonstrably 
discriminatory treatment of tribal tax-exempt bonds. Having reviewed in detail the 
legislative history of the status quo as well as differential treatment of tribes and 
states in IRS audit and enforcement, the article continues in Part IV by applying 
Memmi’s typology of racism in examining the adverse impact of the Act. 
Although there is legitimate concern that leveling the charge of racism might cause 
some to dismiss the underlying merits of the arguments presented in this article, 
Williams correctly notes that “Indian rights will never be justly protected by any 
legal system or civil society that continues to talk about Indians as if they are 
 
76 See Part III infra.
77 Id.
78 Homi K. Bhaba, The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination, and the Discourse of 
Colonialism, in THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994), p. 70. 
79 Id.
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uncivilized, unsophisticated, and lawless savages.”80 Merely substantiating the 
charge of racism is insufficient, however, so this article concludes by proposing 
specific statutory modifications that would eliminate the discriminatory elements 
in the Tax Code.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRIBAL LAW AND POLICY 
The racist notions that led to the restrictions of tribal economic development 
are not new, as the discourse of racism against Indian tribes traces back to the 
origins of the United States itself.81 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 82 the first 
Supreme Court opinion involving an American Indian tribe,83 Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote that “the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by 
peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else.”84 A half century later 
the Supreme Court would opine that the “relation of the Indian tribes living within 
the borders of the United States, both before and since the Revolution, to the 
people of the United States has always been an anomalous one and of a complex 
character.”85 Even today, Supreme Court justices find that “Federal Indian policy 
is, to say the least, schizophrenic. And this confusion continues to infuse federal 
Indian law and our cases.”86 The concept that so confounds both Congress and the 
courts is that, on one hand, Indian tribes are separate sovereigns, “domestic 
dependent nations”87 that are ensconced as a “third sovereign”88 in the federal 
framework. On the other hand, Congress has plenary authority over Indian tribes.89 
While the fabrication of this plenary authority has dubious origins,90 the continued 
 
80 See Williams, LOADED WEAPON, supra note 68, p. xxviii. In comparing the struggle for Indian 
rights with the successful strategies employed by Thurgood Marshall in arguing Brown v. Board of 
Education, Williams argues that “the legal history of racism in American teaches us that the most 
successful minority rights advocates of the twentieth century recognized that the real waste of time 
was trying to get a nineteenth-century racist legal doctrine to do a better job of protecting minority 
rights.” Id. at xxxii. 
81 Id., p. xxv. 
82 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
83 An earlier Supreme Court case, Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 US 543 (1823), dealt with the issue 
of who could acquire title to land from Indian tribes, but no tribe was a party to the case. 
84 Cherokee Nation at 14. 
85 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886). 
86 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004). 
87 Cherokee Nation at 14. 
88 In the words of Justice O’Connor, “Today, in the United States, we have three types of 
sovereign entities – The Federal government, the states, and the Indian tribes. Each of these 
sovereigns … plays an important role … in this country.” O’Connor, Lessons from the Third 
Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 Tulsa L.J. 1, 1997. 
89 Handbook III § 1.03[1] 
90 Arguably, the Supreme Court simply made up the notion of plenary authority. In Kagama, the 
Court stated that 
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the 
United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights 
. . . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of 
the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there 
arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the 
Executive, and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.  
Id. at 383–384. Unable to find a source for such plenary authority in the Consitution, the Court 
held that 
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maintenance of such authority is justified by a racist discourse based on a negative 
perception of tribalism.91
The acknowledged existence of tribal sovereignty, however, has served to 
impede the deleterious exercise of that plenary authority. While each tribe has its 
own separate history, the struggle to maintain a separate sovereign existence is 
common to most tribes. The economic importance of that struggle cannot be 
overstated, particularly in the modern context, as the “first key to economic 
development is sovereignty.”92 It is important to review the origins of the federal 
Indian law and policy before addressing the modern context. 
The schizophrenic dichotomy inherent in the notion of domestic dependent 
nations has been a part of the history of North America from the moment that 
Europeans first made contact with the Indians, in part because multiple competing 
sovereigns asserted claims in North America. Although the doctrines of conquest 
had their origins in legal theories developed to justify the Crusades,93 when 
competing European nations began to expand their empires, the papacy began to 
grant exclusive rights to lands as they were “discovered,” including rights of 
sovereignty over the indigenous populations.94
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now 
weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of 
those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has 
existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of 
the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its 
laws on all the tribes. 
Id. at 384–385. 
91 See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 590 (1823) (“But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this 
country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly 
from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness 
. . .”); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (“[Indians] are in a state of pupilage. Their 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. 515, 588 (1832) (discussing the “humane policy of the government towards these children of the 
wilderness must afford pleasure to every benevolent feeling”). These three cases, often referred to as 
the “Marshall Trilogy,” form much of the foundation for federal Indian law. 
92 Steven Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian Country Today, 5 COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT 5, 5 (1997). 
93 See e.g. Pope Innocent IV, Commentaria Doctissima in Quinque Libros Decretalium, in THE 
EXPANSION OF EUROPE: THE FIRST PHASE 191-192 (James Muldoon ed. 1977), (“[I]s it licit to invade 
a land that infidels possess or which belong to them? … [I]t is licit for the pope to [demand 
allegiance, and] if the infidels do not obey, they ought to be compelled by the secular arm and war 
may be declared against them by the pope and not by anyone else.”) See also Robert A. Williams, 
THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1992), at 
_____. 
94 See e.g. “Bull ‘Inter caetera Divinae’ of Pope Alexander VI dividing the New Continents and 
granting America to Spain, May 4, 1493” in CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES 153-57 
(Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall, trans. And eds. 1967) 
Wherefore, all things considered maturely and, as it becomes Catholic kings and prices … 
you have decided to subdue the said mainlands and islands, and their natives and 
inhabitants, … [w]ith the proviso, however, that these mainlands and islands found or to be 
found, discovered or to be discovered … be not actually possessed by some other Christian 
king or prince.  
See also “Romanus Pontifex,” the papal bull of Pope Nicholas V (1454) (granting Portugal the 
exclusive right to colonize the Canary Islands and all other parts of Africa) in CHURCH AND STATE 
THROUGH THE CENTURIES 153-57; Williams supra note 93 at _____. See also generally Felix S. 
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Even after England broke away from the authority of Rome, English law still 
supported this “Doctrine of Discovery,”95 although the validity of the doctrine was 
a subject of debate among early colonial settlers.96 Irrespective of conflicting 
religious interpretations of Indian rights, practical realities shaped legal relations 
between the Indians and colonists.97 The necessity of getting along with powerful 
and militarily capable Indian tribes98 dictated that the settlers seek Indian consent 
to settle if they wished to live in peace and safety, buying lands that the Indians 
were willing to sell rather than displacing them by other methods. As a result, the 
English colonial governments acquired most of the lands by purchase from the 
Indians.99 For all practical purposes, during this period “the Indians were treated as 
sovereigns possessing full ownership rights to the lands of America.”100 
At the outbreak of the French and Indian War in 1754, treaty making assumed 
a new dimension, as each of the competing European powers sought to form 
alliances with the various tribes. The military importance of treaty alliances would 
continue throughout the Revolutionary War period as well. After the war, however, 
a powerful group of tribes that had sided with the British during the war confronted 
the founding fathers. Those tribes still maintained claims to the territory between 
the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. George Washington 
detailed his proposed policy for dealing with the Indians in a letter to James 
Duane, the head of the Committee of Indian Affairs of the Continental Congress. 
 
Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 Geo. L. J. 1 (1942). 
95 See e.g. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 1378 (K.B. 1608) 
All infidels are in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies (for the law presumes not that 
they will be converted, that being remota potentia, a remote possibility) for between them, 
as with the devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual hostility, and 
can be no peace; … And upon this ground there is a diversity between a conquest of a 
kingdom of a Christian King, and the conquest of a kingdom of an infidel; for if a King 
come to a Christian kingdom by conquest, … he may at his pleasure alter and change the 
laws of that kingdom: but until he doth make an alteration of those laws the ancient laws of 
that kingdom remain. But if a Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel, and 
bring them under his subjection, there ipso facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for 
that they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of God and of nature, 
contained in the decalogue; and in that case, until certain laws be established amongst them, 
the King by himself, and such Judges as he shall appoint, shall judge them and their causes 
according to natural equity. 
This opinion was authored by Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke who, coincidentally, wrote the 
charter for the Virginia Company in 1606. See Williams supra note 93 at _____.  
96 Compare the arguments of John Winthrop (as “for the Natives in New England they inclose 
noe land neither have any settled habitation nor any tame cattle to improve the land by, & soe have 
noe other but a naturall right to those countries.”) with those of Roger Williams (“I have knowne 
them make bargaine and sale amongst themselves for a small piece, or quantity of Ground [and this 
they do] notwithstanding a sinfull opinion amongst many the Christians have right to Heathens 
Lands.”) recounted in Cheister E. Eisinger, THE PURITAN’S JUSTIFICATION FOR TAKING THE LAND, 84 
Essex Institute Historical Collections 135-143 (1948). 
97 See HANDBOOK II, p. 55. 
98 Id. Despite devastating outbreaks of disease, the Indians would continue to outnumber the 
European settlers for several decades. 
99 Id. The Dutch similarly opted to obtain land via consented purchase rather than more bellicose 
methods. 
100 Id.
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[P]olicy and [economy] point very strongly to the expediency of being upon 
good terms with the Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their Lands in 
preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their Country; 
which as we have already experienced is like driving the Wild Beast of the 
Forest which will return as soon as the pursuit is at an end and fall perhaps on 
those that are left there; when the gradual extension of our Settlements will as 
certainly cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho' 
they differ in shape. In a word there is nothing to be obtained by an Indian 
War but the Soil they live on and this can be had by purchase at less expense 
[sic], and without that bloodshed, and those distresses which helpless Women 
and Children are made partakers of in all kinds of disputes with them.101 
Although Washington’s letter has been called the founding document of 
American Indian policy,102 its clearly racist notions sit alongside the pragmatic 
necessity of treating with the Indians. As the newly formed United States began its 
inexorable march westward, the Indian lands usually were not taken by force but 
were instead ceded by treaty in return for, among other things, the establishment of 
a trust relationship,103 often in specific consideration for the Indians’ 
relinquishment of land.104 It is important to note that these treaties were always 
entered into as government-to-government relationships between the tribes as 
collective political entities and the United States.105 From the beginning of its 
political existence, therefore, the United States “recognized a measure of autonomy 
in the Indian bands and tribes. Treaties rested upon a concept of Indian sovereignty 
. . . and in turn greatly contributed to that concept.”106 
Treating tribes as governments was clearly more a function of pragmatism than 
a generally held belief that tribal governments were legitimate sovereigns, and 
although the Indian tribes regarded treaty obligations as sacred, racist notions of 
the inferiority of tribalism prompted many to question whether their provisions 
were binding on the United States. As Williams notes, the legal discourse of 
 
101 Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in Francis Prucha, 
Documents of United States Indian Policy 1-2 (2000). 
102 See e.g., Williams, LOADED WEAPON, supra note 68, p. 44. 
103 The scope of the trust relationship is multi-faceted. “Many treaties explicitly provided for 
protection by the United States.” HANDBOOK II, supra note 7, at 65 n.38. See, e.g., Treaty with the 
Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, art. 2, 7 Stat. 35, reprinted in Kappler, supra note 113, at 25 [hereinafter 
“Treaty with the Creeks”]; Treaty with the Kaskaskia, Aug. 13, 1803, art. 2, 7 Stat. 78, reprinted in 
Kappler, supra note 113, at 67 [hereinafter “Treaty with the Kaskaskia”]. 
Other treaties provided the means for subsistence. See, e.g., Fort Laramie Treaty, supra note 113 
(providing for subsistence rations for the Sioux.); 1828 Treaty with the Western Cherokees, Art. 8, 7 
Stat. at 313, reprinted in Kappler, supra note 113, at 290 [hereinafter “Treaty with the Western 
Cherokees”]; HANDBOOK II, supra note 7, at 81 (“[E]ach Head of a Cherokee family . . . who may 
desire to remove West, shall be given, on enrolling himself for emigration, a good Rifle, a Blanket, 
and a Kettle, and five pounds of Tobacco: (and to each member of his family one Blanket,) . . . a just 
compensation for the property he may abandon.”). 
104 See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, supra note 103; Treaty with the Kaskaskia, supra note 103; 
Treaty with the Western Cherokees, supra note 103; Fort Laramie Treaty, supra note 113. 
105 See, e.g., Treaty with the Six Nations of October 22, 1784, reprinted in Prucha supra note 
113, at 4; Treaty of Fort McIntosh of January 21, 1785, reprinted in Prucha supra note 113, at 5; Fort 
Laramie Treaty of September 17, 1851, reprinted in Prucha supra note 113, at 84 (referring to the 
United States and the Sioux collectively as “the aforesaid nations”). 
106 Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly 2 (1994). 
16 TRIBAL BONDAGE [19-Sep-06 
opposition to tribal sovereignty argued that tribal Indians, “by virtue of their 
radical divergence from the norms and values of white society regarding use and 
entitlement to lands, could make no claims to possession or sovereignty over 
territories which they had not cultivated and which whites coveted.”107 Various 
political factions disagreed over whether tribalism could survive contact with white 
civilization and whether the appropriate course of action was to make the Indians 
assimilate into that society or to remove them beyond the reaches of that society.108 
Ultimately, racist notions of tribal inferiority prevailed, and Congress passed the 
1830 Removal Act.109 Several tribes in the Southeast, however, already had treaties 
that secured their right to remain on their ancestral homeland. In response, Georgia 
Governor George Gilmer declared that  
treaties were expedients by which ignorant, intractable, and savage people 
were induced without bloodshed to yield up what civilized peoples had a right 
to possess by virtue of that command of the Creator delivered to man upon 
his formation – be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it.110 
The practice of purchasing land from the Indians was merely “the substitute by 
which humanity and expediency have imposed, in place of the sword, in arriving at 
the actual enjoyment of property claimed by the right of discovery, and sanctioned 
by the natural superiority allowed to the claims of civilized communities over 
those of savage tribes.”111 Williams clearly demonstrates the racism inherent in the 
legal discourse of the Removal Period.112 Despite these racist notions, however, the 
process of removal itself was accomplished through a series of treaties. Over the 
next forty years, tribal sovereignty was inherently recognized as tribes agreed to 
either remove to the west of the Mississippi or cede portions of their ancestral 
homeland in the face of advancing settlement.113 
107 Williams, supra note 73, 243-244. Such arguments were made by several prominent 
individuals, including President John Quincy Adams. 
The Indian right of possession itself stands, with regard to the greater part of the 
country, upon a questionable foundation. … [W]hat is the right of a huntsman to the forest 
of a thousand miles over which he has accidentally ranged in quest of prey? Shall the 
liberal bounties of Providence to the race of man be monopolized by one of ten thousand 
for whom they were created? Shall the exuberant bosom of the common mother, amply 
adequate to the nourishment of millions, be claimed exclusively by a few hundreds of her 
offspring? Shall the lordly savage not only disdain the virtues and enjoyments of 
civilization himself, but shall he control the civilization of a world? 
No, generous philanthropists! Heaven has not been thus inconsistent in the works of its 
hands. Heaven has not thus placed at irreconcilable strife its moral laws with its physical 
creation. 
Oration at Plymouth delivered at Plymouth Mass. December 22, 1802. 
108 See letter from President Jefferson to William Henry Harrison (Feb. 27, 1803) in Prucha, 
supra note ___, ___ (“[O]ur settlements will gradually circumscribe and approach the Indians, and 
they will in time either incorporate with us as citizens of the United States, or remove beyond the 
Mississippi”). 
109 Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 174 (1982). 
110 Quoted in PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER 196. 
111 Id.
112 Williams, Documents of Barbarism, supra note 73, at 239-58. 
113 See e.g. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 1830, reprinted in 2 Charles J. Kappler, 
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While the formal existence of the United States began at a point in time when 
the prevailing policy recognized tribal sovereignty through the treaty-making 
process, such an orientation was not permanent. In the 1870s Congress ceased 
making treaties with the Indians114 and instead developed a policy of allotting 
tribal lands to individual Indians115 that was characterized as a “mighty pulverizing 
engine”116 that would destroy tribalism and force Indians to assimilate into 
dominant society as individuals.117 Racist notions of the inferiority of tribalism 
were again a catalyst for policy change, but implementation of the policy required 
recognition of tribal sovereignty. Realization of the Allotment Act required 
negotiations with tribal governments, and even when eviscerating the governance 
structure of particular tribes, such as the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, 
Congress still “continued [the existence of tribes and tribal governments] in full 
force and effect for all purposes authorized by law.”118
If the policy objective of the Allotment Act was to improve the lives of the 
Indians, it was a colossal failure.119 Russell Lawrence Barsh and James 
Youngblood Henderson describe the period between Kagama and the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 as one of plenary federal control, with 
 
Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 310 (1904) (signed by Choctaw leaders at bok chukfi ahithac—
“the little creek where the rabbits dance”—providing for the removal from the ancestral homelands in 
Mississippi and Alabama to land in southeastern Oklahoma); Fort Laramie Treaty, April 29, 1868, 15 
Stat. 635, reprinted in Prucha, supra note 101, 109 (signed by the Sioux Nation at the conclusion of 
the Powder River War, establishing a reservation) [hereinafter “Fort Laramie Treaty”]. 
114 Treaty making with the Indians was ended by Congress in 1871: “[H]ereafter no Indian 
nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an 
independent, nation, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty . . . .” Abolition of 
Treaty Making, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871), reprinted in Prucha, supra note 113, at 135. 
115 General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). The statute is also known as the Dawes 
Act after Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts. While the Dawes Act represented the final, full-
scale realization of the allotment policy, many treaties made with western tribes from 1865 to 1868 
provided for allotment in severalty of tribal lands. See Robert Winston Mardock, The Reformers and 
the American Indians 212 (1971). 
116 In an address to Congress in 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt expressed his sense of the 
assimilation policy: 
[T]he time has arrived when we should definitely make up our minds to recognize the 
Indian as an individual and not as a member of a tribe. The General Allotment Act is a 
mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass [acting] directly upon the family and 
the individual . . . . 
117 See Gavin Clarkson, Not Because They are Brown, but Because of Ea: Why the Good Guys 
Lost in Rice v. Cayetano, and Why They Didn’t Have to Lose, 7 Mich J. Race & L. 318, 327 (2002) 
118 Five Tribes Act, Act of April 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137. 
That the tribal existence and present tribal governments of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, 
Cherokee, Creek and Seminole tribes or nations are hereby continued in full force and effect 
for all purposes authorized by law, until otherwise provided by law, but the tribal council or 
legislature in any of said tribes or nations shall not be in session for a longer period than 
thirty days in any one year: Provided, That no act, ordinance, or resolution (except 
resolutions for adjournment) of the tribal council or legislature of any of the said tribes or 
nations shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the United States: 
Provided further, That no contract involving the payment or expenditure of any money or 
affecting any property belonging to any of said tribes or nations made by them or any of 
them or by any officer thereof, shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the 
United States. 
119 Cite to Collier 1934 report. 
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tribes wholly subject to Congress and the president, acting through the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. No local laws or assemblies were recognized, and a 
special police force was established to maintain federal supremacy. 
Traditional leadership was deposed, prosecuted, and sometimes killed when 
in conflict with federal agent policy. 120 
By the 1930s it was clear that the United States needed to change its stance on 
tribal sovereignty again,121 and Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 (IRA).122 In an effort to reinforce tribal sovereignty, the legislation allowed 
tribes to adopt constitutions and to reestablish structures for governance. Post-IRA 
federal treatment of the tribes was less restrictive, allowing for the popular election 
of tribal leaders according to tribal laws and constitutions.123 Congressional policy 
had completely reversed itself—tribal sovereignty was now to be encouraged 
rather than destroyed.  
Contemporaneously with the passage of the IRA, Congress also completed a 
massive overhaul of the securities laws; however, those involved in crafting the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 probably never 
envisioned that tribal governments would ever be in the position to issue tax-
exempt debt. Although this oversight does not have an impact on the tax status of 
tribal debt, the differential treatment of tribal securities relative to securities issued 
by state and local governments adversely affects tribal debt.124 
Federal Indian policy would oscillate through one more cycle in the next half 
century before President Nixon issued a landmark statement calling for a new 
federal policy of “self-determination” for Indian nations.125 Nineteen years after 
the passage of the IRA, Congress again set about destroying the tribes.126 In 1953, 
Congress passed Public Law 83-280, a law that has been described as “a 
monument to congressional ambiguity and indecision.” 127 In Public Law 280,128 
120 RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH AND JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERIONS, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES 
AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 209 (1980). 
121 See e.g. Institute for Govt. Research, Studies in Administration, The Problem of Indian 
Administration (the “Merriam Report,” issued in 1928), documenting the failure of federal Indian 
policy during the allotment period. 
122 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1994). 
123 Barsh & Henderson, supra note 120, at 209. 
124 The lack of a securities registration exemption for tribal municipal bonds imposes a liquidity 
premium. Preliminary research suggests that the premium ranges between 75 and 250 basis points 
(0.75% to 2.5%) of additional interest that must be paid by the tribal issuer. See Gavin Clarkson, 
Racism in the Capital Markets, University of Michigan Working Paper (2006). See also Clarkson 
testimony, supra note 41. 
125 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian 
Policy, H.R.Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. ( July 8, 1970). See also The Indian Financing Act 
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974) (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1453). Perhaps the 
greatest of Nixon’s contributions to Indian tribal sovereignty was Public Law 638, the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638 (1994) (codified in 25 
U.S.C. §§ 450a–450), which expressly authorized the Secretaries of Interior and Health and Human 
Services to contract with and make grants to Indian tribes and other Indian organizations for the 
delivery of federal services. 
126 Barsh & Henderson, supra note 120, at 211. 
127 Act of 15 August 1953, c. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90, originally codified as 18 U.S.C. 1162 and 28 
U.S.C. 1360, as amended 25 U.S.C. 1321-22; Barsh & Henderson, supra note 120, at 127. 
128 See P.L. 83-280, 6 Stat. 588 (1953), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a): “Each of the States 
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Congress, without tribal consent, extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction to 
tribal lands in six states and authorized all other states to assume such jurisdiction 
at their option.129 This act was followed swiftly thereafter with the passage of a 
number of statutes liquidating individual tribes—“these acts distributed the tribes’ 
assets by analogy to corporate dissolution and afforded the states an opportunity to 
modify, merge or abolish the tribe’s government functions.”130 
Federal policy once again reversed itself, and the policy of Termination was 
suspended in 1968 with President Nixon’s policy of “self-determination.”131 By 
“self-determination,” President Nixon sought “to strengthen the Indian's sense of 
autonomy without threatening his sense of community.”132 Self-determination led 
to an increase in economic development activity, but access to capital remained an 
impediment.133 President Reagan made his American Indian policy statement on 
January 24, 1983, stating his support for “self determination.”134 In attempting to 
give definition to “self-determination,” he stated: 
Instead of fostering and encouraging self-government, federal policies have, 
by and large, inhibited the political and economic development of the tribes. 
Excessive regulation and self-perpetuating bureaucracy have stifled local 
decision making, thwarted Indian control of Indian resources and promoted 
dependency rather than self-sufficiency.135 
In 1983, President Reagan established the Presidential Commission on Indian 
Reservation Economies. In 1984 the Commission published its Report and 
Recommendations again calling for a major shift in federal Indian policy.136 The 
Commission promulgated recommendations in the following five categories: 
Development Framework, Capital Formation, Business Development, Labor 
Markets, and Development Incentives.137 Pertinent to the instant inquiry, under 
Capital Formation, the Commission recommended private ownership or private 
management of tribal enterprises; amending the Securities Act of 1933 to place 
 
listed . . . shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are 
parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed . . . to the same extent that such State has 
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general 
application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such 
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the state . . .” (emphasis added). The Supreme Court, 
upon examining the legislative history of P.L. 280, found that the intent of Congress was to apply the 
state rules of decision in Indian Country, not to confer total jurisdiction over Indian lands. See Bryan 
v. Itasca County, supra note ___. 
129 Barsh & Henderson, supra note 120, at 128. The six mandatory states were Alaska, 
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id. at 128, n. 80. 
130 Barsh & Henderson, supra note 120, at 132. Examples of this legislative activity include Act 
of 13 August 1954, c. 732, 68 Stat. 718 (Klamath), Act of 3 August 1956, c. 909, 70 Stat. 963 
(Ottawas).  
131 Id. 
132 Samuel R. Cook, What is Indian Self-Determination?, RED INK, May 1, 1994, available at 
http://faculty.smu.edu/twalker/samrcook.htm. 
133 See HANDBOOK III supra note 7, §21.03 
134 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES Part I, 7 (1984). 
135 Id. 
136 Id.  
137 Id, at 25. 
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tribes on the same footing as state and local governments; amending the Tribal Tax 
Status Act to provide tribes with the same tax exemptions as state and local 
governments; establishing an Indian Venture Capital Fund; and amending the 
Indian Loan Guaranty Fund and the Indian Finance Act to minimize the role of the 
BIA and to encourage the private sector to invest in Indian country.138 
Some scholars have criticized the IRA and the notions of evaluating tribal 
corporations using westernized norms of corporate performance because such 
evaluations often highlight perceived differences between economic development 
in Indian Country and corporate America.139 According to the Memmi typology, 
however, perceptions of difference that are not used to justify hostility are not 
racist, and thus Williams may be incorrect in assuming that capitalist assessments 
of tribal economies are inherently racist.140 Irrespective of whether one views 
capitalism as good or bad, the reality is that tribal nations exist within a larger 
capitalist system, and any assumption that tribes cannot adapt to that system runs 
the risk of falling into the very discourse that Williams decries. Tribes have 
adapted to their environments for millennia, and the arrival of Europeans did not 
diminish that adaptiveness. Many tribes pride themselves on their ability to adapt: 
the Navajos developed a thriving weaving industry using wool from sheep brought 
over by Europeans; the Plains Indians incorporated European horses into their 
culture; and the Choctaw claim that if the Europeans had brought aluminum foil 
with them, Choctaws would have been cooking with it while the other tribes were 
still regarding it with suspicion.141 
The evidence from the last century of tribal economic development indicates 
that tribes can and must compete within the larger capitalist environment, and 
given a level playing field, they can thrive. If the competitive landscape is stacked 
against tribes, however, those impediments can be appropriately characterized as 
racist if they continue to exist with little or no legitimate purpose, given that they 
suppress tribal economic development and curtail tribal access to capital. 
 
138 Id. at 39-47. 
139 See e.g. Williams, Documents of Barbarism, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. at 266-68. Williams takes issue 
with the description of tribal structures contained in the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON 
INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1984).:  
As illustrated by its derogatory nomenclature for describing tribal governments’s 
differences (“social welfare driven”; “patronage system”; “dependent”), the Commission’s 
discourse of tribal self-determination clearly devalues tribal enterprises operated by tribal 
governments according to tribal values...The Commission’s point of reference for assigning 
negative values to contemporary tribalism’s perceived self-determining vision of economic 
development is of course the dominant society’s profit driven norms. Thus, if tribalism 
further declines in response to the federal government’s failure to adequately fund its trust 
responsibility to Indian people, tribalism’s own stubbornly held difference from the superior 
values of the dominant society will be blamed. 
Williams, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. at 267-68. 
140 Id.
141 Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analysis, 50 U. 
KAN. L. REV 502 (2002) 
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II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF PUBLIC FINANCE 
A.  The Nature of Municipal Debt 
Depending on the source of funds used to repay the debt, municipal debt can 
take a number of forms, generally under the umbrella of either general obligation 
or revenue bonds. 
A general obligation bond can be either secured or, more commonly, 
unsecured and, in the latter case, the issuer will generally promise to repay 
principal and interest from any of the issuer’s available funds. 142 In both secured 
and unsecured general obligation bonds, the general credit of the issuer is 
pledged.143 
A revenue bond differs from a general obligation bond in that the debt 
obligation is limited in terms of recourse to a specifically identified source of 
revenue that is pledged to secure the debt.144 The general credit of the issuer is not 
pledged—“[r]evenue bonds, in contrast [to general obligation bonds], pledge 
only the earnings from revenue-producing activities, most often the 
earnings from the facilities being financed.”145 A type of revenue bond 
important to the instant inquiry is the Private Activity Bond (“PAB”). With a PAB, 
a state or local government issues the bond for or on behalf of a private entity—
“[f]or example, a sewer district would issue PABs to build a sewage plant that will 
then be privately managed.”146 
B.  Sources of Municipal Debt 
Although bank debt and bond indentures both represent a promise to pay a 
specific sum of money (principal amount) at a specified date or dates in the future 
(maturity date) together with periodic interest at a specified rate, each type of debt 
has unique attributes and establishes a relationship with a different set of lenders. 
Additionally, given the same level of earnings, an issuer will likely be able to 
borrow larger amounts for longer periods by issuing bonds rather than by 
borrowing from a bank. 
1. Bank Debt 
Commercial banks typically lend money to governmental borrowers as part of 
an ongoing business relationship. For larger amounts, a group of banks (often 
called a syndicate) will collectively lend money to the borrower. A borrower can 
usually borrow up to two times earnings from a bank or bank syndicate, and the 
term of a bank loan (or note) is generally three to five and sometimes up to seven 
years. 
Bank debt can also be used as temporary financing when a borrower plans to 
subsequently issue more debt through a bond offering to finance a larger project. A 
 
142 See Fippinger supra note 20, § 1:2.2 
143 Id. See also Gelfand § 2:05 
144 See Fippinger § 1:2.3; Gelfand § 2:13; Recourse refers to the set of actions that the lender can 
take to obtain payment. In this instance, the lender can only look to the revenues specifically pledged. 
If those are insufficient, the lender cannot look to other assets of the issuer. 
145 Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative Process, 46 ADMIN.
L. REV. 333, 342 (1994). 
146 Id. 
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portion of the bond proceeds are then used to pay off the bank note. 
2. Bond Indentures 
Unlike bank debt that generally has a single lender holding the note, a bond 
indenture is a negotiable instrument that can be bought and sold in the capital 
markets. Thus the lenders, or bondholders, often have no direct relationship with 
the issuer. While issuing a bond is typically a more complex transaction than 
obtaining a bank loan, issuers can generally borrow larger amounts for longer 
terms. An issuer can borrow as much as three to four times its revenues by issuing 
bonds, and the payments can be stretched over ten, fifteen, or even thirty years in 
some cases.  
Bond transactions often involve a financial intermediary, usually an 
investment banking firm that assists issuers in finding buyers for the bond. By 
marketing to a larger audience in the broader capital markets, the financial 
intermediary attempts to obtain the best possible interest rate and terms for the 
issuer, which may often be better than those available from commercial banks. 
An important distinction between bank debt and bond indentures is that unlike 
bank loans, bonds are classified as “securities” and are therefore subject to a 
variety of securities laws. Note, however, that §103(c) of Tax Code treats all 
obligations as “bonds” even if they are bank loans, finance leases, installment 
purchases, or actual bond indentures.147 Thus, while the debt markets differentiate 
substantially between bank debt and bond indentures, the Tax Code does not. For 
purposes of clarity, subsequent use of the term “bonds” in this article refers to 
bond indentures held by the capital markets and does not include the other forms of 
governmental debt considered to be “bonds” under §103. 
C.  Tax-Exempt Debt 
Tax-exempt debt is debt where the interest paid to the debt holder is not 
subject to taxation.148 Because the interest is tax-free, investors are able to generate 
the same after-tax return with a lower interest rate as they would from a similar 
taxable investment that pays a higher interest rate. In addition to the availability of 
lower interest rates, sometimes as much as three-hundred basis points lower,149 
longer terms are also available in the tax-exempt market.  
1. The Historical Justification for States’ Tax-Free Bond Authority: Federal 
Subsidy of Governmental Obligations and State Sovereignty 
When the first Tax Code was established in 1913, state and local bond 
issuances were minimal and Congress desired to avoid political opposition on the 
matter.150 The initial rationale for the exemption has its roots in a constitutional 
theory of intergovernmental tax immunity.151 The modern rationale for exempting 
 
147 26 USC § 103(c); this treatment is also the same for tribal debt under Section 7871(c) of the 
tax code.  
148 26 USC § 103(a); see Gelfand §§ 5:01 et seq. for a thorough discussion of the history and 
policy rationale of tax-exempt municipal debt. 
149 See Handbook III, Sec 21.03. Financial measures are often expressed in terms of “basis 
points.” A 300 basis point difference is the same as a three percent difference. 
150 Gelfand § 1:13. 
151 See Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 585-86 15 S.Ct. 673 (1895) 
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municipal bond interest from taxation is a federal policy of supporting states in 
their operation as governmental entities.152 It has long been recognized that 
“[l]ong-term debt obligations are an essential source of funding for state and local 
governments”153 and that taxing interest paid on state and local bonds “may strike 
at the very heart of state and local government activities.”154 
The ability to issue tax-free debt is crucial not to investors, but to states, 
because investors are willing to accept lower interest rates in exchange for the tax-
exemption.155 In effect, the tax-exemption, although falling to the individual bond 
buyer, is a subsidy to the state treasury.156 The federal government has an interest 
in subsidizing157 state and local government operations because the subsidy both 
facilitates governmental operations at the local level so that the federal government 
does not itself have to provide these services and because it places control over 
what kinds of operations are undertaken in the hands of local officials, thus 
removing these operations from the federal government.158 
This latter rationale – local control – is related to a notion of state sovereignty. 
Indeed, the doctrine of state sovereignty stems from the basic constitutional 
structure that endows the federal government with a limited set of enumerated 
powers.159 Further, the Supreme Court has long recognized the power of the 
federal government to tax states as a threat to state sovereignty.160 To the extent 
 
(holding that a tax on interest income derived from a state bond, whether imposed by the Federal 
government or by another state, was unconstitutional as an indirect tax on the state because of the 
burden it imposed on the state’s ability to issue the bond.) The Court reasoned that, although the tax 
was imposed on the bond-holder, the tax was considered to be “on” the state because a portion of the 
burden, or the “incidence” of the tax, would be borne by the state in an increased interest rate or 
fewer buyers. The Court’s rationale was not limited to bonds in particular, but was based on a theory 
of intergovernmental tax immunity under which it was unconstitutional to tax any state-derived 
income, whether from bonds, employment or leases. See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 
516-17, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (1988) (discussing intergovernmental tax immunity at time Pollock was 
decided). This rationale was later repudiated by the Supreme Court in Graves v. New York ex rel. 
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939) (“The theory ... that a tax on income is legally or economically a 
tax on its source is no longer tenable.”) See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 523-24 
(holding that interest paid on state bonds is not immune from Federal taxation under the 
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity). 
152 As noted infra, the exemption from federal taxation for interest paid on state-issued debt is 
also related to a notion of state sovereignty. This notion of state sovereignty roughly parallels the 
doctrine of Tribal sovereignty, and thus provides analogous support for equal tax-free bond authority. 
153 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 531 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
154 Id.
155 Id. at 185. 
156 Id.
157 The amount of the subsidy is a matter of empirical analysis beyond the scope of this Article; 
suffice it to say, however, the subsidy enjoyed by states is significant. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that without the exemption, states would have to increase the interest they pay on bonds 
by between 28% and 35% over what they are able to pay with the subsidy. Because bond revenue is 
so important to states, “governmental operations will be hindered severely if the cost of capital rises 
by one third.” South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 531 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
158 See Klein supra note 155. 
159 See Lawrence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 381 (2d. ed. 1988). See also, Tenth 
Amendment.  
160 See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S at 533 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Chief Justice 
Marshall from McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819), “the power to tax involves the 
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that states are sovereigns, the federal policy of exempting interest paid on state 
bonds issued to finance and effectuate state policy from federal taxation is a 
recognition and affirmation of that sovereignty.161 
2. Uses for Tax-Exempt Debt 
States issue tax-exempt bonds not only to finance a core set of traditional 
governmental purposes such as building schools, roads, and sewers but also to 
finance airports, docks, commuting facilities, utilities, mortgages, public golf 
courses, and even state lottery buildings and horse race tracks.162 Changes to the 
Tax Code in 1986 sought to restrict this practice by placing limitations on private 
activity bonds.163 After these changes, some municipalities began locating other 
sources of revenue to remain within the permissible tax-exempt bounds while still 
supporting private use projects. Discussing this phenomenon in the case of 
professional sports stadiums, Prof. Frank Mayer wrote:  
The practical result of the 1986 Act was to change the method of debt 
repayment. Municipal officials and stadium owners structured their debt 
repayment so that revenue streams from the actual stadium accounted for less 
than 10% of the total repayment, while the public was responsible for the 
remaining 90%. This financing plan forced the federal government to 
recognize a stadium construction project as a public facility and consequently 
permit tax-exempt bond financing. In order to reach the 90% public funding 
level, municipal governments have employed techniques including increasing 
the sales tax, tourist tax, sin taxes, and implementing a tax on lottery 
proceeds.164 
power to destroy.”)  
161 See Williams supra note 27, at 358 (“Principles of federalism, together with practical 
financial considerations, dictate that the capability of state and local governments to raise and use 
revenue should be facilitated and enhanced whenever possible in order that they may better serve the 
needs of their people.”) 
162 See William A. Klein, Joseph Bankman, Daniel Shaviro, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 186 
(13th ed. 2003). 
163 IRS Revenue Ruling 03-116 explains the section 141 definition of private activity 
bonds as follows: 
Section 141 provides, in part, that a bond is a private activity bond if the bond is issued as 
part of an issue that meets the private business use test of § 141(b)(1) and the private 
security or payment test of § 141(b)(2). The private business use test is met if more than 10 
percent of the proceeds of an issue are to be used for any private business use. The private 
security or payment test is met if the payment of the principal of, or the interest on, more 
than 10 percent of the proceeds of an issue is directly or indirectly (1) secured by an interest 
in property used or to be used for a private business use, (2) secured by an interest in 
payments in respect of such property, or (3) to be derived from payments, whether or not to 
the issuer, in respect of property, or borrowed money, used or to be used for a private 
business use. 
Section 141(e) provides, in part, that the term “qualified bond” includes any private 
activity bond that (1) is a qualified 501(c)(3) bond; (2) meets the applicable requirements of 
§ 146; and (3) meets the applicable requirements of each subsection of § 147. While § 
103(a) of the 1986 Tax Code exempts from gross income interest on state and local bonds, 
such exemption is not extended to private activity bonds which are not also qualified bonds. 
I.R.C. § 103(b)(1). 
164 Frank A. Mayer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where We 
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The more popular approach, at least concerning hotels and convention centers, 
involves management agreements between a private entity and a municipality 
arranging for the private business to run the facility. This practice accelerated after 
1997 when the permissible length of these management contracts was extended 
from five to fifteen years, initiating a “boom in publicly financed hotels.”165 Hotel 
projects, involving tax-exempt issuances of hundreds of millions of dollars, have 
commenced in a number of municipalities, including the following: 
• The Austin City Council approved the authorization of up to $275 million 
of tax-exempt bonds to finance an 800-room hotel near the city’s newly 
expanded convention center.166 
• Baltimore issued $305 million to build a Hilton convention hotel in 
downtown Baltimore.167 
• The Chicago Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority issued $133 
million of tax-exempt hotel revenue bonds for a Hyatt Hotel168 
• The City of Omaha Convention Hotel Corporation sold $103.5 million of 
tax-exempt bonds for a 450-room hotel to be managed by Hilton Hotel.169 
• The Denver Convention Center Hotel Authority issued $349 million in 
revenue bonds to build a 1,100-room hotel managed by the Hyatt 
Corporation.170
• The South Carolina Jobs-Economic Development Authority issued $63.4 
million in bonds to fund construction of a 404-room hotel to be operated 
by Radisson Hotels International Corporation.171 
• The Indianapolis Local Public Improvement Bond Bank issued $18.2 
million in tax-exempt bonds to help fund a 230-room luxury Hilton 
hotel.172 
• Overland Park, Kansas, issued $87 million in bonds to build a 412-room, 
full-service convention center hotel operated under a 15-year contract by 
Sheraton Operating Corporation.173 
• The city of West Palm Beach, Florida, issued $55 million in tax-exempt 
 
Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 210-11 (2005). 
165 Mary Wisniewski, Cities Play Hotel Game: Face Choices on Independence, Risk, BOND 
BUYER, August 30, 2001, at 1. 
166 Elizabeth Albanese, Austin City Council Approves Bond Authorization for Hotel Financing,
BOND BUYER, March 14, 2001, at 5. 
167 Andrew Ackerman, Baltimore Convention Hotel Plan Gets Second Nod From City Council,
BOND BUYER, August 17, 2005, at 5. 
168 Karen Pierog, Chicago hotel revenue to back exposition authority bond sale, BOND BUYER,
February 26, 1996, at 1. 
169 Elizabeth Carvlin, Deal in Focus: City-Backed Omaha Hotel Granted Rare Insurance 
Coverage, BOND BUYER, April 10, 2002, at 34. 
170 Elizabeth Albanese, Deal in Focus: Denver Selling $349 Million for Convention Center 
Hotel, BOND BUYER, June 17, 2003, at 27. 
171 Christine Albano, Big Entrance: Hotel Deals Set Off Frenzied Buying, Earn High Yields,
BOND BUYER, June 6, 2001, at 1. 
172 Elizabeth Carvlin, Indianapolis Bond Bank Plans $28M For Hotel, With Moral Obligation,
BOND BUYER, May 4, 2004, at 4. 
173 Christine Albano, High-Yield Focus: Kansas Hotel Deal’s Revised Structure Eases Buy-Side 
Concerns, BOND BUYER, December 20, 2000, at 7. 
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revenue bonds for a parking structure for CityPlace, a $550 million mixed-
used development downtown.174
• The Virginia Economic Development Review Issued $10 million in tax 
exempt bonds to renovate the Stonewall Jackson Hotel, which contains 
124 deluxe guest rooms.175 
• The District of Columbia Council approved a measure authorizing the 
redevelopment of the Washington Convention Center site, which could 
eventually lead to up to $1.3 billion in tax-exempt bond issuances.176
Private activity bonds are still widely used as an important tool for state and 
local economic development.177 A similar practice involves the issuance of tax-
exempt bonds to build hotels in economically depressed areas eligible by their 
empowerment zone status. Such was the situation in the following instances: 
• Little Rock, Arkansas, voters approved the issuance of $19 million in tax-
exempt empowerment zone revenue bonds to renovate the Little Rock 
Hilton.178 
• San Antonio issued $130 million of tax-exempt empowerment zone bonds 
to finance a new Hyatt Corporation 1,000-room convention center hotel.179 
• The St. Louis Industrial Development Authority issued $98 million of tax-
exempt federal empowerment zone bonds to partially fund the construction 
of a convention center hotel.180 
Tax-exempt bonds have not only been used to build hotels and convention 
centers but also to finance horse tracks owned by counties or municipalities.  
• In 1987, Polk County, Iowa officials issued $40 million in tax-exempt 
bonds to build the Prairie Meadows Horse Racing Track.181 
• Retama Park outside of San Antonio was financed with $75 million in tax-
exempt debt. financing.182 Retama Development, the nonprofit 
organization set to by the city to construct and equip the racetrack in 1997, 
subsequently issued $93.9 million in refunding bonds.183 
• The Grand Prairie Sports Facilities Development Corporation refinanced 
“one of the most successful horse racing tracks in the state” in part by 
 
174 Shelly Sigo, West Palm Beach, Fla., Still Has All-Stars in Its Eyes, BOND BUYER, July 20, 
2001, at 37. 
175 Matthew Vadum, VIRGINIAL: Hotel Gets Facelift, BOND BUYER, October 27, 2005, at 35. 
176 Matthew, Vadum, Old D.C. Convention Center Site Gets Go-Ahead for Redevelopment,
BOND BUYER, June 8, 2005, at 4. 
177 Aprill, supra note __, at 342. 
178 Elizabeth Albanese, Little Rock Voters Approve Hotel Bond Issue, BOND BUYER, July 11, 
2002, at 3. 
179 Elizabeth Albanese, San Antonio Deal for Hyatt Hotel Empowered With Tax-Exemption,
BOND BUYER, April 26, 2005, at 1. 
180 Yvette Shields, St. Louis’ Hotel Financing Deal Wins Investment-Grade Rating, BOND 
BUYER, November 15, 2000, at 3. 
181 Will County Bet on Racetrack Bonds? HOUSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, August 24, 1992, at 1.  
182 Janin Friend, Lone Star racetrack is set to issue debt, but some in industry say deal is risky,
BOND BUYER, July 7, 1994, at 1. 
183 Emily Newman, Tax Enforcement: IRS: Texas Development Corp.’s $171M of Debt May Be 
Taxable, BOND BUYER, January 12, 2005, at 5. 
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issuing $15.2 million of tax-exempt debt.184 
3. Additional Restrictions on Tribal Tax-Exempt Debt 
While the federal policy of exempting interest paid on state bonds from federal 
taxation is a recognition and affirmation of that state’s sovereignty, a similar 
recognition and affirmation of sovereignty unfortunately does not extend to Indian 
tribes to the same degree as state and local governments because tribes face two 
additional restrictions that do not apply to their counterparts. In the first instance 
Indian tribes cannot issue PABs similar to those issued by state and local 
governments.185 As mentioned previously, an additional restriction limits tribal tax-
exempt bonding authority to those projects where “substantially all” of the 
borrowed proceeds “are to be used in the exercise of any essential governmental 
function.”186 As the tax-base of a tribe is usually insufficient for a tribe to issue 
general obligation bonds187 and since the revenue from a revenue bond is usually 
linked to the project being financed,188 this additional restriction to “customary” 
governmental activity places tribes at a tremendous disadvantage relative to the 
capital markets and is inequitable when compared to other forms of municipal 
debt. 
III. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY MANEUVERING OVER TRIBAL TAX STATUS  
A.  The Tax Status of Indian Tribes before the 1982 Tribal Tax Act 
The Tribal Tax Status Act was the culmination of a huge effort by tribes and 
their advocates on Capitol Hill to achieve a measure of equality with states in the 
Tax Code.189 Before its passage, and despite the fact the federal government had 
for more than 150 years recognized Indian tribes as sovereign governmental 
entities with obligations and responsibilities to their constituents equal to those of 
states, Indian tribes occupied a strange and internally inconsistent niche within 
federal tax laws. Prior to 1982, IRS Revenue Rulings rather than statutes governed 
the taxation of tribes.190 Under Revenue Ruling 67-284, the IRS reasoned that 
because tribes occupy a space in government roughly analogous to states, income 
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of a tribal government like that going to a state, is exempt from federal taxation.191 
The IRS failed to pursue the same logic, however, when it denied tribes the ability 
to issue tax-free debt. Revenue Ruling 68-231 erroneously reasoned that since the 
powers of a tribe are delegated to it by the federal government192 rather than a state 
(in that case, Washington), it cannot be considered a “state” for purposes of I.R.C. 
section 103’s exemption from federal taxation for interest paid on state and 
municipal debt.193 Lingering uncertainty because of inconsistencies in how the IRS 
made its rulings on the tax status of tribes led Congress to take up consideration of 
a comprehensive Indian tax law. 
The 1982 act was not the first serious attempt at comprehensive Indian tax 
legislation, as a bill that would have granted tribes a similar tax status to states was 
introduced in 1975.194 This legislation proposed equal treatment in the areas of 
federal excise taxes, charitable donation deductions, and deductibility of property 
taxes. An important provision would have authorized tribes to issue tax-exempt 
bonds on nearly the same grounds as states under I.R.C. section 103.195 The House 
Ways and Means Committee reported H.R. 8989 favorably, 196 but the legislation 
was not considered by the full House.197 No further action was taken198 until 
Congress’s consideration of a senate bill199 that would eventually become the 1982 
Tribal Tax Status Act. 
B.  The Passage of the 1982 Tribal Tax Status Act 
Senate Bill 1298 was introduced by five senators200 for the purpose of 
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equalizing the treatment of states and tribes in a number of areas of the Tax Code, 
including tax-free bonding authority. Senate Bill 1298 would have enabled tribes 
to issue tax-exempt debt obligations to finance their governmental activities under 
section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code.201 Tribes would have achieved equal 
treatment with states by virtue of the legislation’s reference to section 103, which 
defines states’ tax-free bonding authority. At the time this authority was quite 
broad and included the authority to issue controversial industrial development 
bonds for a variety of projects. Tribes were also given such authority in the senate 
bill as long as the trade or business financed by the issuance occurred on the tribe’s 
reservation.202 The Senate Finance Committee reported the bill favorably and 
recommended passage without amendment.203 The Senate incorporated this bill 
into House Bill 5470, the Periodic Payments Settlement Act, which the House 
passed without the tribal tax legislation piece.204 Representative Sam Gibbons (D-
Fl), in particular, objected to the tribal tax provisions, a setback which sent the bill 
to a conference committee to which Representative Gibbons was named.205
While the stated purpose of the introduced legislation was to eliminate the 
perception of differences between tribal governments and state or local 
governments,206 the ultimate legislation that emerged from the House-Senate 
Conference Committee emphasized rather than eliminated those differences. Those 
fundamental changes in the legislation are detailed in the rest of this section. Part 
V will make the argument that, under the Memmi typology, those changes were 
based on racist notions and that their continued existence in the Tax Code is a 
perpetuation of that racism. 
The first major change in the legislation was to specifically prevent tribes from 
issuing any tax-free PABs. Tribes retained the ability to issue general obligation 
bonds, traditionally used for funding ventures such as school construction.207 
Tribal governments, however, “lack[ed] a diversified economy as well as the 
broad, stable tax base” necessary to issue general obligation bonds.208 Thus, tribes 
were “given bonding authority they were unable to use and denied bonding 
authority they would have welcomed.”209 Prior to the emergence of the conference 
bill, every version of the Tribal Tax Status Act had included specific authority for 
tribes to engage in at least some limited form of tax-exempt private activity bond 
financing.210 None of the witnesses or members of the Senate or House in printed 
hearings, committee reports, or debate had ever raised an objection to allowing 
tribes to enjoy the same status as state and local governments relative to private 
activity bonds.211 Moreover, the Treasury Department had specifically endorsed all 
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of the earlier versions of the Tribal Tax Status Act, including the provisions Indian 
tribes used to issue tax-exempt PABs, stating “that tribal governments should be 
treated for federal tax purposes in the same manner as state and local 
governments.” 212 Treasury supported this legislation, despite its broader efforts to 
generally curtail and limit tax-exempt PABs,213 arguing that entities that “are 
similarly situated should be treated alike for tax purposes if the law is to be applied 
fairly and equitably.”214 Given the limited tribal tax base215 available for general 
obligation bonds,216 the ability to issue revenue bonds217 was one of the most 
important provisions sought by tribal governments.  
The Conference Committee Report, however, stated quite clearly that “tribal 
governments are not permitted to issue private activity bonds ([such as] industrial 
development bonds [or] mortgage subsidy bonds),”218 thus ensuring that tribal 
bonds could not be used for economic development projects that might generate 
profits for private actors.219 
If the elimination of any chance of PABs issuance were not bad enough, the 
Conference Committee Report also added the additional requirement on tribes’ 
authority to issue tax-free debt. Tribes were authorized to issue tax-exempt bonds 
“only if such obligation is part of an issue substantially all of the proceeds of 
which are to be used in the exercise of any essential governmental function.”220 
The essential governmental function language may seem innocuous enough, since 
under section 103, states are granted tax-free bond authority as a tool with which to 
perform their general governmental functions.221 The “essential governmental 
function” element of the legislation, however, was unmistakably an “additional 
requirement”222 that was not imposed on states. Thus, by virtue of the 1982 Tribal 
Tax Status Act, Indian tribes only receive tax-free treatment of their debt 
obligations under a narrower set of projects than states. The open question after 
passage of the 1982 act was, what was an “essential governmental function?” 
C.  Initial Implementation of the 1982 Tribal Tax Status Act 
The Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1982 act offered little 
explanation of the essential governmental function requirement but did indicate 
that tribes were granted tax-free bond authority to undertake only a core set of 
government projects, and that Congress was primarily concerned with preventing 
private actors from benefiting from the tax subsidy. Because the essential 
governmental function test also circumscribes tribes’ general ability to issue tax-
free debt obligations under section 103; however, the issue becomes whether tribes 
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themselves (where no private entity benefits) can engage in a broad range of 
activities – such as construction of hotel resorts and public-use golf courses – that 
are not necessarily within a set of core government-provided services. 
In the wake of the passage of the 1982 act, the IRS was charged with 
determining the scope of tribes’ tax-free bonding authority. As Professor Ellen 
Aprill points out, however, defining the term “essential governmental function” is 
no easy task.223 Several Supreme Court cases illustrate the ambiguity of this term 
and its ultimate “unworkability.”224 Early cases upheld federal taxation of income 
paid to the trustees of the Boston Elevated Railway Company because operating a 
street railway was proprietary rather than governmental,225 yet struck down a tax 
imposed on the salary of a New York water system engineer because operating a 
water system had developed into a governmental function.226 Later cases 
effectively eliminated the term from Congress’s arsenal by declaring that “what 
might have been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous 
extension of state activities may today be deemed indispensable,”227 and that the 
distinction had become “too entangled in expediency to serve as a dependable legal 
criterion.”228
To address this issue, tribes obtained legal representation to advise the 
Treasury Department that the essential governmental function requirement should 
be construed broadly in light of the overriding purpose of the 1982 Tribal Tax Act 
to “provide relief to Indians.”229 The strategy worked, and Indians were given tax-
free bond authority under the regulations not only for any activity that would be 
exempt if undertaken by a state or local government but also any activity for which 
Indian tribes receive funding from the Bureau of Indian Affairs under either the 
Snyder Act230 or the Indian Self-Determination Act.231 Because both acts fund a 
broad range of activities,232 tribal bond authority was also relatively broad. For 
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instance, tribes could issue tax-free debt obligations to finance “general support” 
activities and “industrial assistance and advancement.”233
Despite the broad language, very few bond issuances were actually made 
under the 1982 act and the arguably generous (for tribes)234 regulations. Aprill 
reports that only seven tribal issuances had occurred by the time Congress revisited 
the legislation in January of 1988.235 Of these projects, only one was a traditional 
governmental function on the reservation; six were “off-reservation leveraged buy-
outs.”236 For example, one of the reported issuances helped the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa (AZ) Indians purchase a cement factory to be used primarily as an 
income-generating investment to help pay for other tribal services.237 
Despite the small number of reported transactions, this relatively broad 
bonding authority turned out to be short-lived as both the language of the statute 
and the agency’s approach to enforcing it would soon become severely restrictive 
on tribes. 
D.  Congress Slams the Door --The 1987 Amendments to the Tribal Tax Status Act 
Five years after the 1982 act, Representative Gibbons sponsored a measure in 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987238 to restrict the use of tribal 
bonds by clarifying the essential governmental function requirement.239 The House 
Committee Report explained that in light of “recent reports of Indian tribal 
governments issuing tax-exempt bonds for what are substantively interests in 
commercial and industrial enterprises,” the “committee believes [that] it is 
appropriate to reiterate the scope of bond authority granted to Indian tribal 
governments.”240 The clarification measure thus limited essential functions for 
purposes of tribal tax-free bond authority to those functions that are “customarily 
performed by State and local governments with general taxing powers.”241 
233 Id. at 351 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 13).  
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In addition, on September 10, 1987, Gibbons wrote a letter to Treasury 
Secretary James Baker imploring the department to investigate leveraged buy-outs 
by tribes.242 He also noted that such projects are a “far cry from schools, streets and 
sewers,”243 recalling the one line of explanation in the 1982 legislative history 
explaining the essential governmental function requirement.244 
Although it had passed the house, Gibbons’ amendment was not included in 
the Senate version of the 1987 Budget Act, and it was opposed by many in the 
Senate as too draconian. Twenty-two senators wrote a letter to the Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee, to oppose the measure in Conference.245 Their concern 
was that the amendment would stifle tribes’ efforts to “decrease tribal 
unemployment, alleviate poverty, preserve natural or cultural resources of the tribe 
or contribute to tribal economic activity.”246 As an alternative, this group proposed 
targeting potential abuses more precisely by eliminating bonding authority for 
projects that produced only passive income from investments in real estate or other 
off-reservation ventures.247 This less restrictive alternative would have allowed 
tribes to utilize tax-free debt obligations much in the same manner as states. 
Unfortunately, Rep. Gibbons was able to secure an appointment to the Conference 
Committee and was able to push through his stifling amendment with only one 
relatively insignificant carve-out for tribes.248 
While Aprill describes the amendment as a “measure to tighten the tribal bond 
measures by limiting essential governmental functions to those customarily 
financed with exempt bonds by state and local governments,”249 the specific 
statutory language had the potential for a much more restrictive interpretation: 
limiting tribal tax-exempt bond authority to those projects typically financed with 
general tax revenue, a narrower set of projects than those typically financed 
through tax-free debt obligations.250 
E.  The IRS Nails the Door Shut -- Aggressive Enforcement of the Essential 
Governmental Function Requirement  
In the wake of the 1987 amendment, one issue facing tribes seeking to utilize 
tax free debt obligations is that Congress has provided little guidance, other than 
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the limiting language in the 1987 Conference Report, as to what is and what is not 
an essential governmental function customarily performed by states.251 As noted 
above, the uncertainty engendered by these terms provides little guidance for 
regulated entities, in this case, Indian tribes,252 and much leeway to regulators, in 
this case, the IRS. As it turns out, the IRS has taken its cue from Representative 
Gibbons and has recently decided to aggressively enforce an extremely narrow 
interpretation of the essential governmental function requirement. Indian Country 
Today noted that “Indian country as a whole is becoming more familiar” with the 
IRS’s enforcement efforts because of its inclusion in tribal tax-free bond financing 
in its investigative audits.253 For the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and local 
governments issued an average of 14,038 tax exempt bonds.254 Over the same 
period, tribal government annually issued an average of 5 tax-exempt bonds.255 For 
the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, the Tax Exempt Bonds Office closed an average 
of 363 audits each year.256 Assuming that an exam takes two years to complete,257 
this time period results in approximately 1.29% of all state and local tax-exempt 
issues being audited; however, not all of those obligations are considered bonds by 
the capital markets.258
Based on an initial survey of bond lawyers, approximately 20% of all bonds 
under the Tax Code are bond indentures that are held by the capital markets. Thus, 
the approximate lifetime audit hazard rate for municipal bond indentures is 
approximately one-half of one percent. In contrast, there was general belief among 
professionals in the field of tribal debt issuances that the percent of tribal bond 
issues audited is substantially greater. In a March 2005 Bond Buyer article, Charles 
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Anderson, field operations manager for the IRS tax-exempt bond office, stated the 
intention to conduct “a dozen or more examinations of tribal bond issues within the 
next year or so.”259 In September 2005, Charles Anderson stated that twelve tribal 
tax-exempt bonds, six tribal conduit bonds, and six direct tribal issues, are 
currently being challenged by the IRS.260 Christie Jacobs of the office of Indian 
Tribal Governments at the IRS stated during February 2006 that 8 to 10 tribal tax-
exempt issues were currently under audit.261 Dale White, general counsel for the 
Mohegan Tribe, states that of the tribe’s two bond issuances, one has been audited. 
In a January 12, 2006 Memorandum, several Dorsey & Whitney tax attorneys 
expressed the following opinion regarding the IRS’ enforcement practices: 
We believe that, if the Service were forced to defend its position before a 
court, the tribes should prevail on both of these issues [direct tribal issues and 
conduit issues]. Our concern is that, by initiating numerous audits against 
individual tribal issuers, the Service is (a) taking on the tribes one by one, (b) 
without the tribes being able to coordinate their analysis, research and arguments, 
(c) in a situation where it is very difficult to get the issues before a court for 
review.262
This disparate treatment does not show signs of waning. Rick Saskal, of The 
Bond Buyer, recently wrote, “The Internal Revenue Service has been stepping up 
audit reviews of the tax-exempt status of tribal bond issues.”263 
To empirically determine the audit hazard rate for tribal bonds, in April, 2006, 
the author and his tribal finance research team from the University of Michigan 
met with officials and researchers from the Tax-Exempt Bond division of the 
Internal Revenue Service to discuss the issue of tribal tax-exempt bonds and 
develop a research plan to examine whether or not tribal governments were subject 
to a disproportionate audit rate for their bonds. For this work, the IRS examined a 
particular form that is filed by all governments, including tribal governments, 
whenever they issue a debt obligation of any kind. When governments enter into 
debt obligations, if the interest paid to the lender is tax-exempt, then a form 8038 
needs to be filed with the IRS. If the obligation is for an amount greater than 
$100,000, then a form 8038G is filed, otherwise a form 8038GC is filed. 
In collaboration with the University of Michigan researchers, IRS researchers 
determined that 88 tribes had filed one or more informational returns between 
January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2005 (note that this data reflects direct tribal 
issues only; conduit issues are not included in these figures): 
 Form 8038G 136 
 Form 8038GC 169 
 
259 Emily Newman, IRS Looking for Evidence of Arbitrage Abuse, BOND BUYER, March 16, 
2005. 
260 See Alison L. McConnell, IRS' Anderson Says Attorneys At Fault for Tribal Bond Confusion, 
BOND BUYER, September 22, 2005. See also discussion of tribal conduit bonds, supra, note 348.  
261 Figure taken from phone conversation with Christie Jacobs on February 14, 2006. 
262 Mark A. Jarboe, LynDee Wells, Thomas D. Vander Molen, Mary J. Streitz of Dorsey & 
Whitney, Memorandum to Tribal Clients Concerning Tribal Tax-Exempt Financings (January 12, 
2006). 
263 Rick Saskal, Panel: Open Tax-Exempt Market More to Tribes, THE BOND BUYER, September 
26, 2005, at 4. 
36 TRIBAL BONDAGE [19-Sep-06 
On either form, Line 20 allows the tribe to check a box to indicate whether the 
obligation is a lease or installment purchase. The data was then broken down into 
the following: 
 Form 8038GC  
 Leases or Installment Sales 105 
 Bank Loans or Bond Indentures 64 
 Form 8038G  
 Leases or Installment Sales 46 
 Bank Loans or Bond Indentures 90 
The following was also determined, however, in the course of the research: 
• While some tribal debt examinations were initiated from referrals, the 
majority of tribal debt examination cases were initiated by the IRS through 
its normal case selection process. 
• Of the 305 filings (issues), slightly less than 1% are being examined 
• Of the 88 tribes that filed, approximately 3% have bonds under 
examination. 
• The total dollar amount of debt issued during this time period is around 
$700,000,000. 
Although a greater level of detail would of course be desirable, the IRS is 
limited in its ability to disclose based on rather strict confidentiality requirements. 
Thus, the remaining data analysis and conclusions in this section do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the IRS. 
A preliminary survey of tribal bond lawyers indicates that for every tribal bond 
indenture requiring an 8038G filing, four to five bank loans are also closed that 
require an 8038G filing. Thus, for the 90 form 8038G filings from 2002 through 
2005, assuming that 20% were for bond indentures, 18 tribal bonds indentures 
were issued between 2002 and 2005, or an average of 4.5 per year. Municipal bond 
indentures of less than $100,000 rarely exist, if at all, so the 8038GC filings have 
been excluded. If those are not excluded, the average number of bonds is six per 
year; however, data from Thompson Financial on tribal bonds issued between 2002 
and 2005 indicates that there were 20 bonds issued.  
Based on information from tribes and tribal bond attorneys for tribes that are 
currently being audited, all of the audits for debt obligations issued between 2002 
and 2005 were for bond indentures, none was for bank debt. 
Using the IRS data, the three audits for bonds indentures issued between 2002 
and 2005 represent 16.6% of all tribal bond indentures issued during that same 
period, more than thirty-two times the hazard rate for state and local bonds during 
the same period.264 Using the Thompson data generates a tribal hazard rate of 15%, 
or twenty-nine times the hazard rate for state and local governments. In either case, 
the audit hazard rate for tribal bonds in only their first four years after issuance is 
substantially more than an order of magnitude greater than the lifetime hazard rate 
 
264 This disparity can be measured even more precisely if the IRS can determine the total 
number of 8038G and GC forms that were filed between 2002 and 2005. Such a number would 
provide the total number of bonds, which can be compared with the Thompson Financial data for 
capital market bond indentures. 
19-Sep-06] TRIBAL BONDAGE 37 
for state and local government bonds. 
The instances of tribal audits appears even more disturbing when one considers 
the fact that tribal tax-exempt issues make up only one-tenth of one percent of the 
tax-exempt bond market.265 For the years 2002-2004, state and local governments 
issued on average $363.6 billion of tax-exempt debt266 while tribal governments 
issued on average only $202 million of tax-exempt debt.267 The focus of IRS 
resources on issuances making up merely .1% of the total market by itself raises a 
presumption of improper IRS practices toward tribes. 
F.  Is the IRS Blocking a Fire Escape? Uncertainty Regarding Tribal Conduit 
Financing 
Constricted by the discriminatory essential governmental function 
requirement, some tribes have chosen to finance projects such as hotels on a 
taxable basis; however, several tribes attempted to use an alternative tax-exempt 
mechanism referred to as a “conduit financing.”268 In a conduit financing the tax-
exempt security is actually issued by a local government agency (referred to as the 
conduit issuer) to finance a project for a third party (referred to as the conduit 
borrower). The security for this type of issue either is the credit of the conduit 
borrower or pledged revenues from the project itself rather than the credit of the 
conduit issuer. Such securities are not general obligations of the conduit issuer 
because the conduit borrower is liable for generating the pledged revenues. Since 
the conduit issuer is not subject to the “essential governmental function” test, the 
conduit mechanism should enable a tribe to finance projects with tax-exempt 
bonds that it might otherwise have to finance on a taxable basis.269 
Additionally, conduit financing is an established form of public finance 
typically utilized by 501(c)(3) (non-profit) organizations, such as charity hospitals. 
Conduit financing has also won the endorsement of the Tax Court. In Fairfax 
County Economic Development Authority v. Commissioner,270 the Tax Court held 
that the development authority was the real issuer of industrial development bonds 
used to build a facility, a portion of which would be leased to the United States 
Government Printing Office.271 It reached this conclusion despite the fact that the 
federal government was the obligor of the bonds because the credit of the 
government as a lessor of the retail space backed the bonds.272 The Tax Court 
reasoned that form governs substance in section 103 cases and held that the 
development authority be respected as the issuer of the bonds, even though the 
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federal government was the real obligor.273 
Despite the criticism of the IRS’s aggressive approach in the 2002 FSA, 
however, the service is also taking a hostile enforcement stance against conduit 
financing by tribes as well.274 The IRS has now challenged 100% of the tribal 
attempts to issue conduit bonds.275 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MEMMI TYPOLOGY 
The legislative and regulatory activities against tribal bonding authority are 
clearly harmful and discriminitory, but can they still be fairly labeled as racist 
under the Memmi typology, with its four moments of racism? 
1. An insistence on difference, whether real or imaginary  
2. The imposition of a negative valuation upon those seen as differing 
3. Generalizing that difference to an entire group that is then deprecated in turn.  
4. Justifying hostility, aggression, or privilege based on that generalized 
difference.276 
Thus, in order to sustain the charge of racism in the Tax Code, it is necessary 
to elucidate how the ultimate legislation was shaped by perceptions of difference 
that were generalized to a broader group and how the negative connotations of the 
perceived difference were used to justify the hostility or aggression against the 
broader group, either during the legislative process or in subsequent IRS 
enforcement actions. When analyzed within Memmi’s typology, the actions of 
Representative Gibbons and the ultimate acquiescence of his legislative colleagues 
provide just such evidence. Details of the IRS enforcement actions provide further 
evidence. 
A.  Applying the Memmi Typology to Rep. Gibbons 
1. The Strategy of Difference 
Williams has carefully documented the discourse of difference regarding 
Indians from the moment of first contact between Europeans and the indigenous 
inhabitants of North America,277 so by the time a 33 year-old Sam Gibbons was 
first elected to the Florida legislature in 1953, Indian tribes were already well 
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entrenched as different in the minds of many Florida politicians. Having grown up 
in 1920s and 1930s, Gibbons was likely influenced by the dominant view of 
Indians as anachronistic savages, wholly separate from civilized society.278 Having 
attended all-white institutions for his undergraduate and legal education,279 
Gibbons was likely influenced by the rhetoric and practice of segregation. As a 
practicing lawyer, Gibbons might possibly have taken note of the racist discourse 
used to describe Indian tribes in the 1950s, including language used by the 
Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians vs. United States:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent 
were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the 
Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and 
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of their 
land.280 
Although they were likely a source of campfire stories during Gibbons’ 
schoolboy years, the Florida Seminoles were recognized as a sovereign tribe in 
1957, and were thus governed by separate laws and regulations than other 
Floridians, such as Title 25 of the U.S. Code and Title 25 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. As Williams notes, even if Gibbons was not overtly racist, there is a 
substantial body of empirical and theoretical research that “demonstrates that the 
cognitive biases that can give rise to prejudice and racist attitudes can operate in an 
unconscious, automatic, uncontrolled fashion.”281 
However, Gibbons was probably not alone, given that after centuries of overt 
and covert hostility by the United States, the weakened economic state of the 
Florida Seminoles probably did not resemble a sovereign government in the minds 
of most Floridians either. Even once they were acknowledged as a sovereign 
entity, the likely perception was that the tribal government did not provide services 
but instead relied on the federal government. At a minimum, the “savage” 
existence of the Florida Seminoles during his childhood and continuing through his 
election to Congress would certainly have entrenched the tribe as being different in 
Gibbons’ mind. The imputation of a negative value to that difference, however, 
was evident in one instance in a long-running dispute between the Florida 
Seminole tribe and Representative Gibbons. By all accounts, Gibbons harbored a 
lingering hostility toward Indian interests stemming from his involvement in a 
tribal land deal in which trust land was reportedly exploited for private benefit in 
the construction of a 1400-seat bingo hall and a cigarette shop.282 
278 See e.g. Robert F. Berkhofer, THE WHITE MAN’S INDIAN (1979); Williams, LOADED WEAPON,
supra note 68. 
279 The University of Florida did not admit black students until 1958. See 
http://www.ufl.edu/history/1948.html. 
280 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians vs. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955). Note that this opinion 
came the year after Brown’s repudiation of such racist discourse as applied to those of African-
Americans. 
281 Williams, LOADED WEAPON, supra note 68, at 164. 
282 See Aprill supra note 27 at 346 (citing John McCormack, New Riches Grow from Old Burial 
Ground, MIAMI HERALD, May 31, 1983, at 6A). 
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2. The Assignment of Negative Values to Difference 
During excavation for a city parking garage in Tampa in 1979, bones of 140 
Seminole Indians were unearthed on the site.283 The discovery threatened to bring 
the parking garage project to a halt, but the Seminoles proposed to move their 
ancestors’ remains to new land as a solution if they could obtain the necessary 
space.284 Tampa and Florida officials accepted the offer, and federal officials, 
including Gibbons, helped the tribe obtain new trust land for this purpose. The 
Seminoles did, in fact, rebury the bones and erect a museum above the tomb.285 
They also, however, constructed a cigarette shop and large bingo parlor, both 
financed by a private partnership that in exchange received 47% of the proceeds 
from the two operations.286 
Just as municipal entities such as fire departments had long generated 
operational revenues from bingo, 287 commercial gaming on Indian reservations in 
the United States began modestly as a response to a fire that destroyed two trailers 
on the Oneida Indian reservation in Verona, New York in 1975. The reservation 
had neither a fire department nor fire-fighting equipment, and two Oneidas 
perished in the blaze. To prevent such tragedies in the future, reported a tribal 
representative, the Oneidas decided “to raise money for [their] own fire 
department… the way all fire departments raise money: through bingo.”288 
The Oneidas launched a bingo game in an oversized trailer, offering prizes in 
excess of the limits permitted by New York law.289 The Oneidas maintained that 
because they were an Indian nation, they were not bound by state bingo 
regulations. Tribe members claimed that their right of sovereignty entitled them to 
run their own game and to offer a jackpot large enough to draw non-Indians—and 
their money—to a place they otherwise might never visit. 
The Seminoles began their own high-stakes bingo game in Hollywood, 
Florida, in 1979. The Seminole tribe contracted with a non-Indian organization to 
build and manage its bingo hall. The agreement called for the managers to receive 
45% of the profits after repayment of a $1 million construction loan. The enterprise 
was a success, and the Seminoles repaid the loan in less than six months. 290 The 
Seminoles also fought the state in the courts when Florida authorities tried to close 
the Seminoles’ bingo hall in 1981. The tribe argued that Florida did not have the 
authority to prohibit gaming on the Seminole reservation. Ultimately, the Fifth 
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Circuit agreed, 291 relying upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Bryan v. Itasca 
County292 that under P.L. 280,293 if a state regulates but does not prohibit an 
activity, it may not prohibit that same activity in Indian Country. Thus the 
Seminoles secured the right to run their bingo game and pay out unrestricted 
prizes. 
Although the Seminoles had always indicated to officials that they planned to 
use their new land for economic development projects, Gibbons and other officials 
were “incensed” and accused the tribe of “hiding its true intentions about the use of 
the land.”294 With its negative view of commercial activity by the Seminoles, and 
with Gibbons’ support, Florida unsuccessfully sued to halt the activities of the tribe 
by challenging the trust status of the land in Tampa.295 By all available accounts 
Representative Gibbons held a lasting hostility toward Indian interests as a result 
of the Seminole burial ground episode.296 
3. Generalization 
Representative Gibbons’ reported hostility is not limited to the tribe in his 
district, however, as he held a particular suspicion that Indians anywhere could not 
be trusted and would use any opportunity to finance undesirable gambling 
operations.297 In his letter to Treasury Secretary James Baker, he insinuated that 
the tribes were not really acting as governments and used the leveraged buyouts as 
exemplars, all the while ignoring that the revenue generated by those projects went 
to fund essential governmental functions. 298 If not the first, Gibbons was certainly 
one of the early congressional leaders to put forward the generalized notion that 
any commercial or revenue generating activity was somehow less “governmental” 
if it was conducted by a tribe, as that would make it a “far cry from schools, streets 
and sewers.”299 This generalization clearly privileged, to the detriment of the 
tribes, the commercial elements of many state and local governmental enterprises 
that are funded with tax-exempt debt.300 
Various accounts have confirmed that Gibbons’ grudge prompted him to join 
the Tribal Tax Act Conference for the purpose of denying tribes meaningful bond 
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authority.301 Author Emma Gross wrote in 1989 that Gibbons’ “disillusionment 
with his Indian constituency is supposed to be the reason that he currently opposes 
Indian interests.”302 Although Representative Gibbons developed an accepted 
reputation as hostile toward tribal interests in his district, his animosity extended to 
tribal interests everywhere. 
 
4. Justification of Hostility 
Gibbon’s belief that Indians in general are not trustworthy issuers of public 
debt coupled with his powerful position in the House led to the adverse outcomes 
in 1982 and again in 1987. Is it possible that Gibbons’ justifications for hostile 
treatment of tribal tax-exempt debt were based on something other than a negative 
perception of difference between tribal governments and other state and local 
governments? Gibbons did have a reputation as an active opponent of PABs. He 
has been described in various reports as “a longtime opponent of tax-exempt, 
private-activity bonds,”303 as having “maintained a steady opposition to private-
activity bonds,”304 and as “traditionally … an antagonist toward public finance.”305 
Thus, it might be reasonable to argue that Gibbons opposed broad tribal bonding 
authority not necessarily because he was hostile to Indian interest, but, rather, 
because he was hostile toward broad tax-based public finance authority in general.  
This argument fails for two reasons. First, Gibbons not only increased his 
opposition to tax-exempt bond authority in the case of the Tribal Tax Status Act, 
but also supported “tax-exempt financing when it would benefit his (non-Indian) 
constituents.”306 Gibbons’ effort to create a new category of tax-exempt bonds to 
finance the construction and improvement of space centers in Florida307 indicates 
that he was perfectly willing to support broad-based bonding authority when 
Indian tribes were not the beneficiaries. Second, the record is clear that the 
limitations on tribal bond authority not applicable to states or municipalities have 
been enacted “largely at Gibbons’ urging.”308 Thus, the efforts of Representative 
Gibbons, albeit with the consent of the other conferees, imposed a drastic 
limitation on tribes that, to this day, gives them access only to a narrow sector of 
the tax-free capital market. It is undeniable that Gibbons largely created what 
today remains a blatant discrepancy between tribes’ and states’ bonding authority.  
The timing of Gibbons’ legislative efforts as well as his 1987 letter to Treasury 
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Secretary James Baker complaining about tribal tax-exempt bonds309 is also 
suspicious. In 1986, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the litigation regarding 
the Seminole’s land-into-trust application for the Tampa property,310 so having lost 
in the effort to fight tribal economic development in his own district, Gibbons 
expanded his efforts in 1987 to thwart economic development throughout Indian 
County. 
The results of Gibbon’s hostility is self-evident. Because of the additional 
restrictions imposed on Indian tribes that do not apply to state and local 
governments, tribes cannot issue PABs similar to those issued by state and local 
governments,311 nor can they issue tax-exempt debt unless “substantially all” of the 
borrowed proceeds pass the ill-defined essential governmental function test. 
B.  Applying the Memmi Typology to IRS Enforcement Activity 
Through its enforcement activities, the IRS continues to propagate this racism 
in the Tax Code. Although the legislative restrictions resulted from demonstrably 
racist motives, the IRS has chosen to pursue the most restrictive interpretation 
possible in its enforcement, exacerbating the racist effect. In fairness to the IRS, 
however, it does not have the freedom to ignore or fail to enforce a racist statute. 
On the other hand, the enforcement actions of the IRS suggest that it is further 
exacerbating the racist impact of §7871 by pursuing an extremely narrow, and 
arguably incorrect, interpretation of the statute. 
1. The Strategy of Difference 
Although tribes are not states, the direct congressional intent of the Tribal Tax 
Status Act was to treat tribes like states. In the eyes of the IRS, however, if a tribe 
is involved with a commercial activity, it is somehow less of a government, even if 
the revenues from that activity fund basic governmental functions. The IRS does 
not seem to take the same position with states that are involved with commercial 
activities, such as state-run liquor stores in New Hampshire, state operated hotels 
resorts, and convention centers, or public golf courses. Thus the perception of 
difference between tribal commercial activity and state commercial activity is a 
false difference. Nonetheless, the IRS continues to insist that such a difference is 
meaningful relative to tribes. For example, Charles Anderson of the IRS’s tax-
exempt bond enforcement program, speaking about the Pauite golf course, recently 
stated:  
However, anyone other than the law firm issuing an unqualified opinion and 
maybe being sued by a tribe would concede that a hypothetical golf complex - 
having multiple prestige courses in a resort town with a website advertising 
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planned hotels and casinos, and who has marketed the courses in partnership 
with travel promoters - is essentially commercial in nature.312 
Anderson continued:  
If there are more golf holes than tribal members it is probably commercial 
and intended solely for tourists. If no tribal members work there and they all 
collect a dividend, it is probably commercial. I don't think Congress ever 
anticipated several dozen people getting six-figure checks due to a resort 
financed by tax-exempt bonds.313
Standing in stark contrast, the Maryland Board of Public Works, in 1996, 
approved the sale of $26 million in tax-exempt revenue bonds as partial funding 
for a golf resort in western Maryland.314 State officials indicated that the state-
owned golf resort would include a 220-room hotel and a public golf course, 
designed by Jack Nicklaus, on the grounds of Rocky Gap State Park and is a long-
planned economic development project for Alleghany County.315 
2. The Assignment of Negative Values to Difference 
Anderson’s words strongly suggest an imposition of a negative value on 
tribal commercial activities, as does an August 9, 2006 advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking from the IRS. In that notice, the IRS suggests that tribal bonds would 
only be tax exempt if 1) Numerous State and local governments with general 
taxing powers have been conducting the activity and financing it with tax-exempt 
governmental bonds; 2) State and local governments with general taxing powers 
have been conducting the activity and financing it with tax-exempt governmental 
bonds for many years, and 3) the activity is not a commercial or industrial activity, 
even if states and local governments routinely engage in such activities for 
commercial purposes. Clearly the IRS has a strongly negative view of tribal 
commercial activity relative to state and local governmental commercial activity. 
3. Generalization 
Since the Tax code applies to all tribes equally, the generalization of the 
negative view of tribal commercial activity is automatic, and tribes throughout the 
United States have been victims of this aggressive enforcement of a racist statute, 
resulting in a demonstrably stifling effect on tribes’ tax-free bonding authority. The 
communications from some at the IRS seem to give the impression that the IRS 
believes that all tribes are wealthy tribes engaged in gaming and are thus not 
entitled to tax-exempt treatment, since they would merely be receiving a subsidy 
for commercial activity. This generalization of tribal economic status is 
particularly harmful to poorer tribes, as these restrictions on the scope of what can 
be financed with tax-exempt debt in particular deny poor tribes the opportunity to 
address their glaring infrastructure and economic development needs. Tribes with 
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substantial natural resources or significant gaming operations have the option of 
financing certain activities on a taxable basis even if, absent a restrictive Tax Code, 
they would be able to finance those activities on a tax-exempt basis. As mentioned 
earlier, however, poorer tribes do not have that luxury, and upwards of $50 billion 
in annual capital needs go unmet in Indian Country, in part because the debt 
service required to finance the projects to meet those needs is too expensive at 
taxable rates.  
The IRS’s generalization of the restrictive provision of §7871 to all tribes has 
also meant a substantially higher audit risk for tribal bonds, as tribal governments 
are also victims of a demonstrably disproportionate number of IRS enforcement 
actions. Less than 1% of the tax-exempt municipal offerings are audited by the IRS 
each year, but direct tribal tax-exempt issuances are 30 times more likely to be 
audited within four years of issue,316 and 100% of tribal conduit issuances have 
been or are currently being challenged by the IRS.317 In all of these cases, the tribes 
financed activities that had previously been financed by state and local 
governments without any challenge from the IRS. 
In the specific instance of the Paiute golf course audit, in arguing that that the 
golf course was not “intended to meet the recreational needs of [the] Tribe or that 
it is anything other than a commercial enterprise of [the] Tribe,”318 the IRS is 
apparently making another generalization that Indians do not play golf, and if they 
do play golf, they only play at courses that would never attract a non-Indian golfer. 
4. Justification of Hostility 
In a recently issued Technical Advice Memorandum (“TAM”),319 the IRS 
justified its hostility towards tribal conduit financing by suggesting that allowing 
tribes to use the conduit mechanism would “would run counter to Congressional 
intent.”320 Even though the very legislative history cited in the TAM suggests that 
water treatment plants fall squarely within the definition of an essential 
governmental function,321 the IRS is nonetheless challenging the tax-exempt bonds 
issued by the Morongo tribe for “water and wastewater system improvements, 
roadway improvements, and public parking facilities.”322 
As discussed earlier, the IRS’s most publicized enforcement of the essential 
governmental function test occurred in August of 2002 when the IRS advised the 
Las Vegas Paiutes that construction of a public golf course is “other than an 
essential governmental function within the meaning of § 7871(e).”323 The IRS 
advised that it would deny the tax-exemption based on its reading of the 
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“customary use” definition provided by the 1987 amendment. The IRS 
acknowledged that “it is likely that construction and operation of golf courses are 
customary governmental functions,” but nonetheless concluded that the admittedly 
commercial nature of the project rendered it outside the scope of the tribe’s tax-
free bond authority as limited by section 7871(e). The IRS reasoned that Congress 
did not define “customarily” in the statute and that “there is an argument” that such 
commercial ventures cannot be considered within section 7871(e). Section 7871(e) 
simply defines “essential governmental function” as excluding projects “not 
customarily performed by State and local governments.” It says nothing of the 
commercial or non-commercial nature of those activities.324 Mary J. Streitz of 
Dorsey & Whitney explains that  
[o]ver-relying on selected portions of the legislative history, the FSA 
suggested that tribal governments may not finance “commercial or industrial 
facilities” with tax-exempt bonds even where such facilities satisfy the 
customary performance test. Although the House Ways and Means 
Committee had indicated a concern about tribal governments financing 
commercial and industrial activities with tax-exempt bonds, the committee 
chose to adopt only the customary performance test to address its concerns.325 
Streitz concludes that “[t]he entire legislative history reinforces that the statutory 
test turns on the frequency of a government practice, not on any other 
requirement.”326 
The argument set forth by the IRS is that the golf course was not “intended to 
meet the recreational needs of [the] Tribe or that it is anything other than a 
commercial enterprise of [the] Tribe.”327 Although other public golf courses can be 
considered essential governmental functions, in this case “the probable role of the 
Golf Course in the community contrasts with that of the more typical golf course 
developed by a state or local government.”328 Given the unlikelihood that tribal 
members would use the course for recreational uses, the “Golf Course could be 
seen as disproportionate when viewed as a community amenity, making the 
balance between community recreation and commercial implications more 
significantly tilted toward the latter than is likely to be typical.”329 Mary Streitz 
counters that, in this analysis, the FSA overlooks the fact that “many state and 
local government golf courses are “destination” golf courses intended to attract 
visitors from outside the community in which the golf course is located, thus 
promoting economic development in the community and raising revenues for the 
state or local government” (emphasis in original).330 Therefore, the FSA essentially 
says that Indian tribes cannot utilize tax-free debt to construct golf courses and 
accompanying club houses if the courses pass a subjective line of being too nice 
for tribal members. One wonders if the same public course in a place like Palm 
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19-Sep-06] TRIBAL BONDAGE 47 
Beach would encounter these same difficulties. The FSA admits that all publicly 
built and operated golf courses “are developed to enhance the lifestyle of both 
golfing and non-golfing citizens of the community and perhaps to create jobs,” but 
nonetheless denies the tribe’s admitted effort to “further the economic 
development of [the] Tribe and to reduce [the] Tribe’s dependence on” its limited 
available resources,331 because these are commercial rather than recreational 
pursuits.   
The FSA noted that “[t]he legislative history of § 7871(e) indicates that 
Congress meant not to include commercial or industrial facilities as essential 
governmental functions even if such functions were commonly financed with tax-
exempt bonds by state or local governments.”332 Indeed, the legislative history 
indicates that tribes were faced with a more limited authority than states and 
municipalities. As noted above, the House Committee Report on the 1987 
amendment stated that only customarily publicly-financed projects are intended to 
be within the tribes’ authority, “notwithstanding that isolated instances of a state or 
local government issuing bonds for another activity may occur.”333 Thus, the IRS 
at once acknowledged that “there were at least 2,645 public golf courses in 
1998…and it is probable that the number has grown,”334 and in the same FSA 
memorandum, relied on legislative history deeming projects that may be financed 
by states with tax-free bonds “in isolated instances” beyond tribal authority.  
The FSA recommended not litigating the bond exemption because it would “be 
difficult to argue that Golf Course is so commercial in nature that state and local 
governments would not own and operate similar enterprises.”335 Additionally, it 
acknowledged that “some courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have adopted the 
principle that federal statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of Native 
Americans, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”336 In short, the 
IRS’ position was untenable based on existing public practices and judicial rulings, 
but it nonetheless proceeded with hostile enforcement actions. 
The 2002 FSA has inspired a number of criticisms, most recently in the form 
of a report issued by the Advisory Committee to the Internal Revenue Service on 
Tax Exempt and Government Entities (“ACT”).337 The ACT Report is harshly 
critical of the FSA, emphasizing that public golf courses are in fact customarily 
owned and operated by state and local governments. The ACT Report further 
requests that the IRS cease any new audits and enforcement initiatives, withdraw 
the 2002 FSA memorandum, and most importantly, clarify that essential 
governmental functions for purposes of section 7871 be construed in accordance 
with the term “essential governmental function” as it is used in section 115 of the 
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Internal Revenue Code for benefits accruing to state and local governments.338 
Section 115 provides that gross income “does not include income derived from 
any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and 
accruing to a state or any political subdivision thereof.”339 The IRS takes a broad 
view of what is excludable under section 115.340 In determining whether the entity 
can exclude its income from federal income tax liability, the IRS employs a three-
part test: 1) whether the entity makes or saves money for a state or local 
government, 2) whether its assets revert to the state upon dissolution, and 3) 
whether there is any private benefit.341 In a sharp contrast to its approach in the 
2002 FSA to defining an essential governmental function as excluding any 
commercial activity, the IRS has reasoned that a state investment fund for cash 
balances constitutes an essential governmental function because “it may be 
assumed that Congress did not desire in any way to restrict a state’s participation in 
enterprises that might be useful in carrying out those projects desirable from the 
standpoint of the state government which, on a broad consideration of the question, 
may be the function of the sovereign to conduct.”342 
As mentioned earlier, several states have even issued tax-exempt bonds in 
support of their gaming operations such as lotteries and horse racing.343 Similarly, 
a number of municipalities have financed hotels and convention centers with tax-
exempt bonds.344 Given the uncertainty as to whether these activities have reached 
a level of “customary” occurrence, tribes have thus far been unable to borrow 
directly on a tax-exempt basis to finance their own casinos or other gaming 
facilities.345 For purposes of section 115, however, the IRS has, without 
intervention by Congress, effectively defined any activity that makes or saves the 
government money as an essential governmental function. This definition 
encompasses the very purpose of the Las Vegas Paiute Golf Course, which the IRS 
has reasoned does not qualify as an essential governmental function.346 
Despite the arguably racist heritage of the essential governmental function test, 
the IRS is also using that test to justify its hostility against tribal conduit financing. 
Despite the formal legality of the conduit arrangements, the IRS has begun to 
scrutinize conduit borrowing engaged in by Indian tribes, arguing that “[i]n 
general, any transaction done indirectly that cannot be done directly is 
troubling.”347 
All the tribal conduit borrowings have been reported as under scrutiny by the 
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IRS.348 One involves two hotel and casino complexes in Florida built by the 
Seminole Tribe, one in Tampa and one in Hollywood. These projects together 
utilized $345 million in tax-exempt bonds.349 The conduit issue for these projects 
was the Capital Trust Agency, an entity created by the city of Gulf Breeze and the 
town of Century, both in Florida.350 Another publicly scrutinized conduit 
borrowing involves the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians in which the California 
Statewide Communities Development Authority issued $145 million in tax-exempt 
bonds.351 In the Cabazon case, the tribe received a letter from the IRS indicating 
that the tribe “may have issued an obligation substantially all of the proceeds of 
which were not to be used in an exercise of an essential governmental function of 
the tribe.”352 The IRS recently issued a technical advice memorandum taking the 
position that tribal proceeds from conduit financings are subject to the “essential 
governmental function” test.353 This memorandum was criticized by Mark A. 
Jarboe of Dorsey & Whitney LLP as an instance of the IRS taking “a results-
oriented approach to creating an ambiguity because of what they think Congress 
meant rather that what Congress said.”354 
Aside from the IRS’s investigation of this method of tribal financing, conduit 
financing itself is a far less efficient method of accessing tax-free debt than direct 
issuance by a tribe. Consider the Seminole case, where issuance costs amounted to 
9.2% of the bond proceeds.355 These fees cut into the amount available for 
investment in the tribal enterprise, making the tribe’s income-generating effort less 
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effective and certainly far less efficient than a direct issuance. Clearly, the source 
of this method of debt-financing, untoward, in the eyes of the IRS, and expensive, 
for tribes, is an outgrowth of the stifling effect of the essential governmental 
function requirement on tribes’ direct access to the tax-free market. The conduit 
approach would be altogether unnecessary, however, if the discriminatory aspects 
of §7871 were eliminated. 
CONCLUSION 
A.  The Policy Reasons for Expanding Indian Tribes’ Tax-Free Bond Authority 
In the past the federal government has shifted its policy toward American 
Indians with the policy ranging from evacuation of Indians from their native lands 
in a “trail of tears” to a “reorganization” effort to anglicize Indians to complete 
“termination” of the tribal structure.356 In the late 1960s the federal government 
abandoned the policy of termination in favor of the policy of tribal “self-
determination” in order to strengthen both the federal government’s service 
programs for Indian tribes and increase the ability of tribes to design and operate 
their own programs.357 Commentators have described the failed effort in 1975 to 
place tribes on equal footing with states in the Tax Code as part of this era of self-
determination efforts.358 The authority to supplement tax revenue by issuing tax-
free debt obligations is clearly a major part of any state’s efforts to develop and 
maintain its infrastructure and economy.359 The policy of self-determination, along 
with the legal recognition of tribes as governments with responsibilities to their 
constituent populations, necessitates tax-free bond authority.  
Yet tribes, to this day, and as a direct consequence of the essential 
governmental function requirement, do not enjoy such authority to any meaningful 
degree. Not only are these restrictions discriminatory against Indian tribes, 
inconsistent with the federal policy of self-determination and contrary to the legal 
recognition of tribes as governments, but also they are a stifling repression of the 
efforts of the historically most impoverished, isolated, and disaffected minority 
group360 in the nation to improve their daily lives. Indeed, although the law now 
technically grants tribes tax-free bond authority, the essential governmental 
function test in realty renders this power one that exists in theory only.361 
Williams concluded that the 1982 legislation and its failure to provide the 
much needed tax-free bond authority equal to that of states indicated both that 
“Congress ignored the express desires of the Indian tribes,” and that “non-Indian 
policymakers are still insensitive to Indian preferences – an attitude that has 
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characterized the long and dismal history of federal Indian development policy.”362 
Even today, most Indian tribes find themselves in a territorially remote location, 
cut off from easy access to capital markets, out of sight and mind from investors, 
and stuck with a crippling, third-world level of infrastructure.363 
In addition to the investment and employment issues, most tribes’ lack of a 
natural and diversified tax base also limits their ability to raise revenue.364 The lack 
of a tax base both heightens the need for alternative sources of revenue, such as 
tax-free debt, and hinders the ability to issue general obligation bonds backed by 
the full faith and credit of the tribe.365 Thus, in the arena of tax-free bonds, 
allowing tribes to use debt obligations to finance projects normally provided by the 
private sector but lacking in Indian country, such as mortgage bonds or owner 
occupied housing, would be a sensible and fair policy. In enacting tribal bond 
legislation, however, Congress has chosen not to consider alternatives that would 
address these deeply rooted obstacles facing tribes. Despite the rhetoric paid to 
recognizing tribes as governments and equalizing their tax treatment with that of 
states, Congress gave tribes a limited authority to utilize tax-free debt obligations 
that resulted in only seven known issuances.366 Even with this small use of this 
limited bond authority, Representative Gibbons spearheaded an effort in Congress 
that further limited tribes’ bonding abilities. The result is that tribes are effectively 
limited to their general obligation bonding capabilities, which, as noted earlier, is 
largely illusory for economically strapped Indian tribes. 
This problem is particularly acute for poor tribes. Tribes with substantial 
natural resources or significant gaming operations have the option of financing 
certain activities on a taxable basis even if, absent a racist Tax Code, they would 
be able to finance those activities on a tax-exempt basis. Poorer tribes, however, do 
not have that luxury, and more than $50 billion in annual capital needs still go 
unmet in Indian Country,367 in part because the debt service required to finance the 
projects to meet those needs is too expensive at taxable rates.  
Given the level of “commercial” activity by states and local governments that 
is funded with tax-exempt debt, the expanding hostility towards revenue 
generating activity by tribal governments is indefensible in any intellectually 
honest manner. Congress itself has recently passed legislation that acknowledges 
that tribally sponsored commercial activities can nonetheless be essential 
governmental functions.368 This recent pronouncement provides an opening for 
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Congress to act on the issue of tribal tax-exempt bonds. Tribal governments need 
the ability to issue tax-exempt debt on the same basis as state and local 
governments. To continue to deny them such ability is to continue to foster a racist 
Tax Code. 
B.  Proposed Legislative Solution 
As discussed in Part II, tribes are similarly situated to states in terms of their 
governmental obligations to their citizens. Tribes also enjoy a significant degree of 
sovereignty as domestic dependent nations. Therefore, tribes should, as a matter of 
both policy and equity, enjoy an identical status as states in the Tax Code, 
including the broad ability to issue tax-free debt. Although legislative proposals 
have been offered in the past that would put rectify the inequities in §7871 and put 
tribal debt on an equal footing with municipal debt for tax law purposes, such 
legislation has yet to pass.369
Indian tribes have for centuries existed in a kind of dual world where they are 
sovereigns for some purposes but treated as if their governmental responsibilities 
are not real for other purposes. The Tax Code’s restriction on tribal tax-free 
bonding authority is an example of the latter. This restriction is an unjustifiable 
discrimination against Indian tribes by the Congress in the enacting legislation and 
by the IRS in its enforcement actions. Moreover, the official federal policy of 
Indian Tribal Self-Determination requires meaningful access to the tax-free bond 
market if it is to be successful.  
The Supreme Court’s view of economic development as an essential 
governmental function bears repeating: 
Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted 
governmental function, and there is no principled way of distinguishing it 
from the other public purposes the Court has recognized.370 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was not opining on an Indian law case but was 
instead discussing economic development in the municipal context.  
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Under the status quo, the Tax Code and the IRS are systematically 
discriminating against tribal governments relative to state and local governments. 
Congress has the opportunity to rectify this differential treatment simply by 
rewriting section 7871 to treat tribes as states for all tax purposes, without 
qualification: 
Sec. 7871. Indian tribal governments treated as states for certain purposes.  
(a) General rule. An Indian tribal government shall be treated as a State-- 
 (1) for purposes of determining whether and in what amount any contribution or 
transfer to or for the use of such government (or a political subdivision thereof) is 
deductible under-- 
 (A) section 170 [26 USCS § 170] (relating to income tax deduction for charitable, 
etc., contributions and gifts), 
 (B) sections 2055 and 2106(a)(2) [26 USCS §§ 2055 and 2106(a)(2)] (relating to 
estate tax deduction for transfers of public, charitable, and religious uses), or 
 (C) section 2522 [26 USCS § 2522] (relating to gift tax deduction for charitable 
and similar gifts); 
 (2) for purposes of any exemption from, credit or refund of, or payment with respect 
to, an excise tax imposed by-- 
 (A) chapter 31 [26 USCS §§ 4001 et seq.] (relating to tax on special fuels), 
 (B) chapter 32 [26 USCS §§ 4064 et seq.] (relating to manufacturers excise 
taxes), 
 (C) subchapter B of chapter 33 [26 USCS §§ 4251 et seq.] (relating to 
communications excise tax), or 
 (D) subchapter D of chapter 36 [26 USCS §§ 4481 et seq.] (relating to tax on use 
of certain highway vehicles); 
 (3) for purposes of section 164 [26 USCS § 164] (relating to deduction for taxes); 
 (4) for purposes of section 103 [26 USCS § 103] (relating to state and local 
bonds); 
(5) for purposes of section 511(a)(2)(B) [26 USCS § 511(a)(2)(B)] (relating to the 
taxation of colleges and universities which are agencies or instrumentalities of 
governments or their political subdivisions); 
 (6) for purposes of-- 
(A) section 105(e) [26 USCS § 105(e)] (relating to accident and health plans), 
(B) section 403(b)(1)(A)(ii) [26 USCS § 403(b)(1)(A)(ii)] (relating to the 
taxation of contributions of certain employers for employee annuities), and 
(C) section 454(b)(2) [26 USCS § 454(b)(2)] (relating to discount 
obligations); and 
(7) for purposes of-- 
(A) chapter 41 [26 USCS §§ 4911 et seq.] (relating to tax on excess 
expenditures to influence legislation), and 
(B) subchapter A of chapter 42 [26 USCS §§ 4940 et seq.] (relating to private 
foundations). 
(b) Treatment of subdivisions of Indian tribal governments as political subdivisions. 
For the purposes specified in subsection (a), a subdivision of an Indian tribal government 
shall be treated as a political subdivision of a State if such subdivision has been delegated 
the right to exercise one or more of the substantial governmental functions of the Indian 
tribal government. 
(Sections (c), (d), and (e) should be repealed). 
For the sake of consistent federal policy toward Indian tribes, for the sake of 
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tribes’ right to economic independence, and for the sake of eliminating a harmful 
and discriminatory law, Congress should act to equalize tribal bond authority with 
that of states. 
C.  Positive Federal Revenue Impact 
In addition to the policy rationale for eliminating racism in the tax code by 
equalizing tribal tax-exempt bonding authority, such an expansion would actually 
increase federal tax revenues. Given the high levels of unemployment throughout 
Indian Country, there are no labor market constraints, and thus any jobs created as 
a result of projects funded with tax-exempt bonds will likely be filled by 
previously unemployed individuals. Those individuals will pay income and social 
security taxes, and their employers will contribute additional payroll taxes. Even 
without factoring in the reduction in welfare transfer payments that result from 
increased employment and increased per capita income, economic models clearly 
demonstrate the positive federal revenue impact of increase tribal bonding 
authority.371 
Conversely, the maintenance of the current restrictions on tribal tax-exempt 
bonding authority have a negative impact on federal tax revenues. Since these 
restrictions keep otherwise viable projects from being funded, the federal treasury 
is losing out on tax revenues that would otherwise be generated in the absence of 
these restrictions. Sound fiscal logic and the obvious policy imperative strongly 
suggest that Congress should eliminate the racist restrictions on tribal tax-exempt 
bonding authority. 
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